Protecting the Innocent: Are Our Nations Schools Prepared for Terrorism on Campus?

By

James R. Walker, Ph.D.

Danny W. Davis, Ph.D.
Introduction

There is little doubt that the role of the police administrator and police officer has changed since that dark day in September of 2001, when Islamist terrorists struck at the very heart of the United States in New York City. This terrorist act not only resulted in many innocent civilian lives lost, but hundreds of our fellow law enforcement officers and firefighters suffered injuries or made the ultimate sacrifice. These “first responders” demonstrated unspoken selfless dedication as they rushed into the deadly chaos that erupted in the aftermath of the two airliners piloted into the Twin Towers by fanatical terrorists.

Since that tragic event, the question that all of our school officials, both public and private, elementary school though university levels should be asking themselves is: “Are we adequately prepared to meet the challenges of a terrorist act on or near our campus?” With an estimated total enrollment of 76,632,927 students (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000) and close to six million adults working as teachers or staff (as cited in Greene, 2003) more than one fifth of the U.S. population can be found in our nation’s schools on any given day. As a society we cannot afford to take chances with our future, the country’s student population. Campus police administrators must take a deliberate and measured approach to prepare for the possibility of a terrorist attack on their campus.

The question the average person might ask is, “Why would terrorists want to target our nation’s schools?” A March 2000 article by Kenneth Trump and Curtis Lavarello which appeared in the American School Board Journal titled “No Safe Haven” perhaps gives one of the better answers to this question. The authors stated that, “Unfortunately, schools provide a “soft” target to terrorists, and the idea of terrorist attacks on American schools is not farfetched” (p. 2). Trump and Lavarello then
commented that when terrorists select their targets they are trying to achieve two simultaneous goals. The first priority is to send a strong message to their opponents by attacking a symbolic target. Secondly, terrorists desire “to produce mass fear, alter the ways people live their lives, and corrode people’s confidence in the government” (Trump & Lavarello, 2000, p. 2). The answer as to whether the Islamist terrorists would target a school, unfortunately, has already been answered. Just this past September Islamist/Chechen terrorists seized a middle school in Beslan, Russia. This incident and its effects will be discussed in detail later in this article.

If the stated goals of Islamist terrorists and their violent actions in Russia and around the world are not considered viable evidence of threats to American schools, more specific evidence to that effect has recently been unearthed by U.S. forces in Iraq. “Federal law enforcement authorities notified school districts in six states last month [September, 2004] that a computer disc found in Iraq contained photos, floor plans and other information about their schools…” (Feller, 2004, p. 1). Details of schools in eight school districts were included on the disc. The districts were located in California, Georgia, Florida, New Jersey, Michigan, and Oregon. The threat to American campuses is HERE, NOW.

communications capabilities, and [3] a plan for continuity of operations” (p. 398). It is within this general guidance that the campus police administrator must act.

**Purpose of Study**

It is ironic that a decade after the winning of the Cold War, America finds itself again concerned with preparations for protection of infrastructure systems and facilities and public safety akin to civil defense concerns of the 1950s and 1960s. The purpose of this analysis is not to find error or to pass judgment on those brave officers and firefighters that gave their all on 9/11. Rather the objective is to explore four important areas or concerns. First, to briefly review terrorism in the twentieth century and the ongoing threat posed by Islamist terrorists to our nation’s schools. Secondly, to analyze the current ability state of our nation’s campuses to manage a terrorist event from the viewpoint of current campus policing administrators. Thirdly, several recommendations are provided for the campus police administrator regarding advance preparations a department may take to reduce the chaos such a terrorist event on campus could cause. Finally, this paper provides information to help increase the overall confidence of the campus security staff in antiterrorism; and to aid them in educating other university employees and the student population.

**Terrorism – A Human Condition**

Since time immemorial radical individuals have attempted to use terror to influence governments and societies. An ancient Chinese warrior-philosopher Wu-Ch’I spoke of the impact of the dedicated warrior. “This is the reason one man willing to throw away his life is enough to terrorize one thousand” (as cited in Sun Tzu, 500 B.C./1963). For purposes of this study, terrorism is the “premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, April, p. xiii).

The twentieth century is replete with examples of terrorist activities. On June 28, 1914, a terrorist act took place in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina that proved to have worldwide consequences for millions of people. It was on that day that Gavrilo Princip, member of a seven-man team of assassins (Wren, 1971, p. 8), shot and killed the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The Archduke was heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s throne. Princip was a member of the Black Hand, a Serbian terrorist group, bent on forcing the independence of Serbia from that Empire. Gavrilo’s terrorist act was the trigger that ignited the fires of the First World War.

In the 1920s, 1930s and throughout the Second World War, state sponsored terrorism was used extensively by the governments of both Germany and the Soviet Union. Hitler’s Nazi Party expertly used legal and illegal political maneuvers, propaganda, and terror to seize power in Germany (Shirer, 1960). Even before coming to power, Hitler organized his Strumabteiluing or Brown Shirts. The mission of these “roughneck war veterans” (Shirer, 1960, p. 42) was to protect Nazi functions and meetings and break up meetings of the opposing political parties. In February 1933, Hitler’s henchmen staged the burning of the Reichstag, allegedly by “a demented Communist arsonist” (Shirer, 1960, p. 192). It was this terrorist act, blamed on another political group that provided the spark which ignited Hitler’s subsequent rise to power.

During the same time period Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin was using similar tactics to solidify his hold on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Soviet OGPU
forerunner to the KGB] and the Checka (state police) fulfilled much the same role as the fallen Czar’s secret police had. The role of these organizations was to secure the regime. Part of that task included control of the citizens by surveillance, intimidation, and outright terror tactics. Untold thousands of Russians and other ethnic groups living within the Soviet borders were arrested. Individuals deemed the most threatening to the state were tortured and/or executed without trial or after the farce of a judicial proceeding. Fear of the power of the state reigned supreme in Russia. Terror was the tool that fueled this fear and controlled the Soviet Union’s diverse population.

In the United States terror was the chosen tactic of a nation within a nation. The Ku Klux Klan used intimidation and terror tactics in the attempt to insure that “American soil was kept ‘pure’” (The Golden Era of Indiana, 2004, p. 3). The Klan’s agenda was America for white, Protestant citizens. Terror tactics were used to discourage and intimidate black voters and any “foreign” whites who might not line up on the “correct” side of an issue.

While the South is the best known locale for these clandestine and/or illegal Klan activities, in the 1920s the mid-west fostered a Klan political movement that overlapped into legitimate politics. During this decade 30 percent of the white males in Indiana, 250,000 men belonged to the Klan (Lutholtz, 1991). In 1925, the Klan party controlled the great majority of elected offices in the state government. Over the next decades popular support for the Klan would begin to fall off drastically.

“After fascism was defeated in the Second World War, the old western colonial powers began to feel both international and indigenous pressure to release their colonial peoples” (Davis, 2003, p. 19). The Soviet Union decided to maintain a military presence
in the nations of eastern Europe it had liberated from Nazi control. In fact during the
1950-1960s Russian military might was used to crush popular revolts in East Berlin,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (Morris, 1981). The pressure against colonialism
and the polarization of the world into two Cold War camps set the stage for the next
generation of those willing to terrorize their political opponents into change or
compliance. Revolutionary groups began to rise in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.
The Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent, Communist China surfaced as sponsors of many
of these groups. Also, after 1947, playing into this mix of geo-politics were the reactions
of Muslim nations to the newly independent Nation of Israel.

Many of the international terrorist groups that surfaced to attack the west during
the late 1960s and through the 1980s were tied to the Soviet Union by training, tactics,
logistical support, and in some cases the communist ideology. In 1960, Patrice Lumumba
Friendship University opened in Moscow. The University’s mission was to teach
“students from underdeveloped countries so they can return to their homelands to become
the nucleus for pro-Soviet activities” (Sterling, 1981, p. 133). Clarie Sterling, in the book
_The Terror Network_ (1981), documented this and numerous other connections between
the Soviets and varied terrorist groups.

Any group with a goal that had the potential to negatively impact the stability of a
western democracy was eligible for support. Of course, this support came with a price.
Soviet sponsored terrorist training camps were located behind the Iron Curtain, in
Lebanon’s Bekka Valley, Syria, and Libya. Groups such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang,
the Red Brigade, the Irish Republican Army, and the Palestine Liberation Organization
[just to mention a few] met, trained, and planned operations at these secure sites.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s these groups conducted kidnappings, aircraft hijackings, bombings, assassinations, bank robberies, etc. to further their various causes. Cross group support/coordination was not uncommon during these years. The idea being that a blow struck against a western government, even if it was not the group’s specific enemy, was a blow nonetheless.

**The Islamists**

It is from this tradition of an international “terror network” (Sterling, 1981) that the radical Islamic or Islamist threat we face today has risen. One main difference in the situation is that Russia now finds itself targeted by the same Islamists that target the western governments. To understand the Islamists, their religion must be understood. It is religion with both a religious and a political agenda. And the two cannot be separated.

The Islamist movement of today finds its spiritual motivation in the Wahhabi tradition of Islam. This tradition has as its foundation the fanatical ideas of a thirteenth century Islamic theologian, Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya. This man sought to purify Islam by insisting on “an exclusive focus on the Quran and hadith [Islamic tradition]” (Benjamin & Simon, 2002, p. 45). Additionally, Taymiyya sought a complete union between the religious establishment and government (Benjamin & Simon, 2002).

In the middle eighteenth century outcast cleric, Muhammad ibn Abd- al-Wahhab, seized on ibn Taymiyya’s theme of purifying Islam. It was al-Wahhab, allied with Sheik Abdel Aziz ibn Saud that brought the warring tribes of Arabia under the House of Saud. To this day the Wahhabi tradition holds sway in Saudi Arabia. This tradition of Islam,
does not distinguish politics from religion, thus distorting both. It is further fed by grievances stressed by Bin Laden and widely felt throughout the Muslim world – against the U.S. military presence in the Middle East, policies perceived as anti-Arab and anti-Muslim, and support of Israel. (9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 362)

The Klan movement and the popular support it garnered in 1920s Indiana is illustrative of a similar phenomena, now evident in segments of the Muslim world. The gun-toting Islamist can depend on support from large numbers within the Muslim faithful. This support can be characterized in three ways. First, support from theologians. The Wahhabi religious infrastructure of Saudi Arabia still preaches its radical version of Islam. There is still an on-going program to spread this version of Islam and build mosques worldwide. “The vast majority of American mosques are funded with Saudi Arabian money, and most of the funders ascribe to the Saudi doctrine Wahhabism” (Emerson, 2002, p. 41).

The second level of support to terrorists comes from some governments with majority Muslim populations. Even after the crackdown, post 9/11, the U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism report (2004) lists Iran, Syria, Libya, and Sudan as sponsors of terrorism. In addition to these terrorist sponsors, there are other Muslim governments that have factions within them that provide support, or turn a blind eye to individuals that support terrorist activities.

Finally, at the individual level, the vast majority of Muslims are not willing to pick up arms and join in jihad, or holy war. Pipes (2002) cites survey and election data to “suggest that dyed-in-the-wool Islamists most places constitute no more than 15 percent
of the Muslim population” (p. 2). Still, among the “Arab street” there is a significant number of people that openly sympathize with the mujahideen battling the infidels. A major reason for this sympathy to such groups is a bitter resentment of the special relationship between the United States and Israel.

In 1981, Rees explained one of the reasons that a small cell of terrorists could produce an effect seemingly beyond the capability of their limited numbers. The reasons - improvements in electronics, explosives, and communications have provided the terrorist the capability to attack the target society and gain immediate media attention. The truth of this resonates even louder today with the threat of weapons of mass destruction getting into the hands of terrorists. This threat combined with the attacks of 9/11 provided the strategic impetus for our national leaders to adopt a policy of pre-emptive war. The reasoning being that Islamist terrorist groups, with a sworn goal to destroy our way of life, and the potential to acquire weapons that produce catastrophic casualties cannot be allowed to plan and coordinate such attacks with impunity.

The U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency of the Department of Homeland Security recently published a brief that provides insight into the Islamist Movement. The brief relates that, “Message Forums on the internet have become the prime method of communication for terrorist groups and sympathizers” (Jihadi Graphics and Images, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Brief, undated, p. 2). Information on explosives, software piracy, computer hacking, religious imagery, and tributes to martyrs are to be found on many of these sites. Trends and indicators of future intent of some groups can also be gleaned from the images of these sources (Jihadi Graphics and Images, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Brief, undated). While Federal agencies focus
significant assets on monitoring such Islamists sites, periodic exposure of campus peace
officers to such sites ought to be part of any annual training program.

In the last three years there are numerous lessons from which security
professionals in the United States can glean useful knowledge. The attacks in Indonesia,
the Madrid train bombings, attacks and kidnappings in Saudi Arabia, and most recently
the Islamist/Chechen terrorists actions that have struck the Russian homeland. Although
these attacks were not necessarily launched by the same groups, the common thread that
runs through these terrorist organizations is the Wahhabi tradition. It is this movement
that provides the religious justification, i.e. a radical interpretation of the
Koran, that fuels the violence against non-Muslims or infidels and Muslims deemed as
heretics.

The two Russian airliners destroyed in flight by two female suicide bombers on
August 24, 2004, are case and point. Ninety people died in the two attacks. The
Islamboulli Brigades claimed responsibility on a web site for the incidents (Alfano,
2004a). The message stated, “There will be, God willing, more waves until we humiliate
the infidel state called Russia” (Alfano, 2004a, p. 6). Seven days later, in Moscow,
another Chechen woman, Roza Nagayeva [the sister of one of the suspected suicide
bombers], blew herself up outside of the Rizhskaya [subway] station” (Alfano, 2004a, p.
10). Again it is the same Islamist theology driving the Chechen terrorists that provides
the justification for terror tactics to al-Qaeda and allied groups.

The Russian School Siege

The attack that holds the most lessons for campus security professionals is the
recent three day siege at the school in Beslan, Russia. On the first day of September
2004, “approximately 17 - 30 masked men and women [armed] with explosives and automatic weapons” (Alfano, 2004b, p. 2) seized a middle school holding over 1,000 students, parents, and teachers hostage.

The assault began at 9:30 am, while students, parents and teachers were gathered in a central courtyard for the opening day ceremony. During the initial assault, two on duty police officers were killed resisting the attackers. Two additional people were killed and ten wounded by gunfire as the terrorists took control of the school. Some civilians were able to hide in a boiler room and escaped the campus later that morning.

Now in control of the campus, the terrorists began to segregate their hostages according to sex and physical condition. Freed hostages later reported that two terrorists wearing suicide-bombs “exploded themselves in the corridor, where male hostages were being kept” (Mansfield, 2004, p. 1). Other hostages were moved into the school gym. One woman survivor later reported that, “They told us to sit down and began to mine the gym. Two big explosive devices [were] placed in the basketball hoop” (Mansfield, 2004, p. 1). Not only buildings but “the surrounding area” (Alfano, 2004b, p. 3) was wired with improvised explosive devices.

Shortly after securing the campus, the terrorists passed a written demand to the surrounding security units. Demands included: 1] pullout of Russian troops from Chechnya; and 2] the release of Ingush rebels, captured the previous June and held in Russia. The terrorists took an unusual step to set the parameters for negotiations. They declared that they would accept only three men as spokesmen for the Russian government. These were the provincial presidents of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, and
Leonid Roshal. Roshal had acted as negotiator with the Chechens terrorists who seized the Moscow theater in 2002 (Alfano, 2004b).

By the morning of Day 2, negotiators had convinced the terrorists to release 26 women and children. In the gym conditions steadily worsened. The Islamists did not offer even the least consideration in the way of privacy, sanitary conditions, or basic human needs to their hostages. Drinking water was not allowed. Later in the day the terrorists destroyed two cars with rocket-propelled grenades (Alfano, 2004b). This action was apparently taken when the autos ventured within the militants’ security area. The dead bodies from the first day’s fighting were still strewn over the campus. Negotiations continued with the hostages becoming ever more desperate and confused.

Fifty-six hours into the siege, noon on Day 3, Russian negotiators convinced the terrorists to allow vehicles on to campus in order to remove the dead (Alfano, 2004b, p. 6). Just after 1 p.m., government vehicles appeared on campus. As Russians began the body removal, “terrorists began shooting” (Alfano, 2004b, p. 6) at the exposed security and aid workers. Simultaneously, a number of children broke from the gym and ran for safety. The terrorists opened fire on these youngsters.

At 1:20 p.m., “two explosions were heard and the shooting intensified around the school. Russian security forces began to storm the school” (Alfano, 2004b, p. 6). By then a general gun-battle broke out and hundreds of desperate hostages began to break for freedom. Demolition men of the security forces blew a hole in a wall to provide an additional escape route for the civilians.

The Chechen terrorists had pulled off an infamous operation. Three hundred and fifty hostages were killed, 700 were wounded (Mansfield, 2004, p. 1). Two hundred and
eighteen of the wounded were children. Twenty terrorist were killed, “ten of them from Arab countries” (Alfano, 2004b, p. 7). For days after the siege the Russian FSB [Intelligence Service] and other security forces continued the search for some terrorists that had evaded capture.

Several facts have emerged in the wake of the siege at Beslan. The terrorists’ claimed to be members of “The Second Group of Salakhin Riadus Shakhidi” (Alfano, 2004b, p. 8). This is a Chechen separatist group, led by Shamil Basayev and Magomet Yevloyve. A source of the Russian news agency, Itar-Tass, reported that the operation “had been financed by Abu Omar As-Seyf …believed to be al-Qaeda’s representative in Chechnya” (Alfano, 2004b, p. 8).

The actions of the terrorists’ “operation closely followed the terror roadmap laid out in issue 10 of Al Battar, al-Qaeda’s online training manual” (Mansfield, 2004, p. 1). The late Abdel Aziz al Moqrin [killed last June by Saudi security forces], head of al-Qaeda’s Saudi Arabian cell, was the author of this practical, deadly guide. The section followed so closely by the terrorists is titled, “Kidnapping for Dummies” (Mansfield, 2004, p. 1). The manual contains sections such as “How to deal with hostages”; “Reasons to kidnap”; “Requirements needed in forming a kidnapping group”; and “Beware the negotiator”. Other advice included: “Do not be affected by the distress of your captives. Abide by Muslim laws as your actions may become a Da’wa [call to join Islam]. Avoid looking at women” (Mansfield, 2004, p. 1). Here again are common threads that bind this transnational terrorist movement, made up of multiple groups, that
targets non-Muslims: 1] extreme Wahhabi doctrine that provides the justification to kill; and 2] practical guidance in terror tactics.

Several characteristics of the terrorist siege in Beslan are common to the operations of other terrorists groups; and could be expected should such an assault occur on an American campus. Needless to say the militants’ actions are planned to create fear, not only among the victims, but in the larger population. Attacks are random and symbolic, designed to breach social norms. Finally, and most important, the terrorist acts to influence political behavior of the target society / government (Title 22, United States Code Section 2656f(d)).

**Results of IACLEA Survey On Terrorism Preparedness**

In order to measure the current preparedness of our nation’s campuses a recent survey of campus police executives was completed by the authors of this article. A twenty one question survey was provided to the staff of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA). The survey was then emailed to 1,035 campus police executives. The respondents were located in and around the United States, as well as several foreign countries.

Of the 1,035 surveys sent out six percent or 79 executives responded. While the respondent levels were low, it is believed the respondents who did respond would fairly represent the opinions of the general population. This was particularly true since the respondents came from schools of various sizes and campuses literally all around our nation. The resulting returns will first be given for the reader as they were first compiled. An analysis of the results will then follow in a later section.
The vast majority of respondents, 96.2%, were located in the United States. Of these, 40.5% indicated they had been an administrator for less than five years. Fifty point six percent of the respondents had departments with less than 20 officers. Administrators reported that 46.8% of their officers were sworn and 36.7% non-sworn and 16.5% stated there department consisted of both sworn and non-sworn officers.

The chief administrator responses indicated that 77.2% of the campuses did the majority of the training of their officers jointly with the assistance of other outside law enforcement agencies. Of the responding agencies 32.9% of the officers had state minimum training per year and 53.2% had either forty hours or more of training per year. For 74.7% of the respondents there were two reasons for failure to conduct training: 1) Lack of training funds; and 2) Lack of manpower to cover shift responsibilities while other officers attended training classes. Only 13.9% stated that they felt well prepared to handle a terrorist event. The majority of respondents, 83.6%, stated they were somewhat prepared to not adequately prepared for such an event on campus.
## Campus Police Administrator Demographic Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campus Location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the U.S.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>96.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside the U.S.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Time as Chief/Administrator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5 years</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 years</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15 years</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20 years</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20 Years</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-20 Officers</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-40 Officers</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-60 Officers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+ Officers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission status of officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sworn peace officers</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Sworn officers</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both sworn and non-sworn</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Demographic information collected from 79 campus police chiefs/administrators.

Of the respondents 50.6% indicated that they had participated in 1-2 training classes or events related to antiterrorism. Only 12.7% had been involved in five or more such training events on their campus. The respondents indicated that the amount of support respondents received from other administrative personnel for antiterrorist related training on their campuses ranged from 36.7% which had full support from the administration to 58.2% who reported that they received minor to no support from upper administration. One respondent replied that his administration felt that such an event could not happen in their small town. Twenty-one and one half percent of respondents stated there was the lack of appropriate funds for such antiterrorist related training.
## Training Status and Readiness Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who supplies majority of training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Staff does all training</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own staff/outside help</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own staff/other university personnel</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside vendors do all training</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of training hours required yearly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State minimum only</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight hours over minimum</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forty hours per year</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceeds forty hours per year</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary reason more training is not done</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of funding</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack or personnel/manpower concerns</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of support from administration</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How well department could handle a terrorist event</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well prepared</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat prepared</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not adequately prepared</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of training events related to terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 or more training events</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4 training events</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 training events</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No classes taken</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support received from other administration for terrorist related training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full support for terrorists training</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate support for terrorist training</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor to no support for terrorist training</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason more terrorist training not done</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough funds available</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduling and staffing problems</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low priority for administration</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Responses collected from 79 campus police chiefs/administrators. Number may not total 79 for each category as some survey questions were not answered.
Forty-three percent of administrators in the survey had scheduling and staffing problems that blocked such training for their departments. Finally, antiterrorist training was perceived to be a lower priority than other campus concerns for campus administrations in 9% of the surveys.

Of the responding administrators 53.2% indicated that they had either held, or had participated in, a mock exercise on their campus either internal to their department or in conjunction with other law enforcement and emergency responder personnel. However, only 22.8% of respondents stated that they had a special team on campus that was trained to handle a terrorist event. Seven point six percent of those respondents indicated that this team also served as their swat or special response team for other law enforcement related issues on campus. Of those that did have a special response team only 8.9% cross-trained for such events with their regular campus officers. Also, 62% indicated that they currently had a written plan to address terrorists concerns on their campus. Many of the administrators indicated that their plans were multi-purpose plans used to respond to any emergency that would occur on campus. Thirty-eight percent of respondents indicated that they had no specific plan to address such an event on campus.

When asked if they had trained with or been trained by outside agencies regarding terrorist related events 11.4% indicated they had been trained by or trained with federal law enforcement personnel. Only 3.8% of respondents had trained with or been trained by state law enforcement personnel. Training with or by county or local law enforcement personnel represented the most common anti-terrorism training conducted at 34.2%. Two and a half percent indicated they had trained with or been trained by other campus law enforcement personnel. Finally, 26.6% answered with the choice “other”, which was
an open ended question that allowed the respondents to offer an alternative answer of their own. The majority of respondents who responded with their own answer related that they had trained with or been trained by multiple agencies, which included a few or all of the original choices given for this response.

The administrators were also polled to see if they would be open to additional training if that training were provided at little or no cost. An interest in such specialized training was indicated by 94.9% of responding administrators. Since IACLEA also offers an anti-terrorism course at no cost to the campus police administrator the question was also posed to determine how many of the chief administrators had taken advantage of that specialized training. Of the respondents 32.9% indicated they had taken such a course from the IACLEA. The remaining 67.1% had not been to such an IACLEA training course. Also of the respondents 96.2% stated that given the opportunity to hold a mock exercise on a regional basis they would consider taking such a course.

Findings

It is apparent from the survey returns that the majority of campus police administrators feel their campuses could be better prepared to react to terrorism. Many of the campus administrators responded that they felt their schools were vulnerable to a terrorist attack. Only 13.9% felt like they were adequately prepared for a terrorist event, while 83.6% stated that they were somewhat prepared to not adequately prepared for such an event. Additionally, only 62% had a written plan to address emergency incidents on campus, and the majority stated these were often multipurpose plans to handle various emergencies that may arise on their campuses. These results should be a matter of great
concern to the campus police executive, as prior planning is imperative to appropriately responding to any terrorist event.

In July of 2002, at the annual conference of the National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO) more than 1,100 professionals from 48 states were asked a similar question about the vulnerability of the nation’s schools and their readiness. Nearly 95% stated they felt their schools were vulnerable, and 63% characterized their schools as “somewhat vulnerable”. Thirty-two percent stated their schools were “very vulnerable”. Given these responses, it is apparent that both the executives and the campus officers themselves feel they are not at this time adequately prepared to handle such incidents on campus. Additional training would most likely boost confidence in the readiness factor and gives the campus officers and their superiors the extra edge that is needed to handle a volatile situation that would follow an actual attack.

This same report by NASRO revealed that of the officers polled 55% responded they had not received anti-terrorism specific training. Eighty-two percent of school based officers whose districts had in-house security stated that they had not received any anti-terrorism training. Additionally, 77% of respondents indicated that their district administrators, teachers, and support staff have received no anti-terrorism specific training. In this survey 20.3% of respondents stated they had conducted no terrorism related training events. Just over half, 50.6%, of the respondents reported taking part in one or two training events related to anti-terrorism scenarios.

The NASRO study did not indicate the reasons antiterrorism related training had not been conducted. The survey reflected in this paper revealed that an overwhelming 74.7% of the surveyed campus police executives had two primary reasons for this lack of
focused training. Reason one was a lack of appropriate funds for antiterrorism training. The second reason was insufficient personnel to cover shift requirements for officers absent for training. These same constraints were not unexpected, as a previous study of Texas school district law enforcement by Walker (2003) noted these same constraints present in our public schools regarding training issues. It was not due to a lack of willingness to undergo such training, in that 94.9% of the respondents indicated they would like to see additional training for their officers.

Antiterrorism training was in fact desirable, if it could be provided at low or no cost to their department. Additionally, the vast majority of those surveyed, 96.2%, stated if given the opportunity to participate in regional mock training exercises they would willing devote time to such training. The training process must be an integral piece of the overall response puzzle. The following clarification of the learning process itself is offered below to further solidify our position regarding the importance of the training process. It is critical to enhance the knowledge, skills, and abilities of the campus officers that would respond to a terrorist event.

**Training: The Learning Process**

Problem based learning [PBL] “is an approach which the problem comes first- knowledge is developed during the process of studying problems or real life scenarios” (Morrison, 2004, p. 174). The concept first originated in medical schools at Case Western University and McMaster University in Canada in the 1950s and the 1960’s, respectively. Weiss (2003) described the highest purpose of PBL “to stimulate student activity and engagement” (p. 26). Weiss also remarked that PBL was a good choice for what he called “ill structured” problems, i.e. similar to the types of problems police
officers face on a daily basis. These are problems that often have several possible solutions or perhaps no solution at all. Such chaotic problems found in the wake of a terrorist attack are not bound by discipline boundaries (Stinson and Milter, 1996). In other words, the officer may need to draw from a number of different fields in order to solve a problem or series of problems.

PBL may also be described as collaborative and authentic in the sense that it promotes higher order thinking in the student and it is often grounded in the students past experiences. Such personal experience illustrates well the behavior and responses that individuals will display in the case of an emergency situation. People take what they have learned or experienced in the past and apply it to the current situation at hand. This type of learning experience can take place in groups with ill structured problems given by the instructor in the classroom, or may be simulated effectively in a mock training exercise.

Experiential learning, as described by Kohl in 1984, recognizes that each of us have our own learning style. Kohl categorized people into four types of learners; accommodators, diverges, assimilators, and convergers. In spite of these styles, Kohl posited that everyone learns in a basic two step process. Step one - by inputting information and processing information. Step two then remarks that people often differ in how they prefer to do that (Little, 2004). Kolb described four stages in his model:

- Concrete experience- being fully involved in her-and-now experiences.
- Observations and reflection- reflecting on and observing their experiences from many perspectives.
 Formation of abstract concepts and generalization-creating concepts that integrate their observations into logically sound theories.

 Testing implications of new concepts in new situations- using these theories to make decisions and solve problems (Swanson & Holton, 2001, p. 168).

 Two aspects of a training exercise offer the campus police administrator and the officer the maximum opportunity to learn. First, an exercise provides a real time [although simulated] experience. This is the best environment in which to learn. The second aspect that enables learning connected to an exercise is the ability to reflect and review one’s performance after such an event. A realistic training exercise, with an integrated after action review process included offers the ideal way to transfer practical lessons learned to a real terrorist incident that may happen on campus.

 Just as important to the process is the review and reflection time that should be spent after completion of the mock training exercise. Two terms used to describe the reflection process [or after action review] are reflection on action and reflection in action. Reflection on action has been described by Merriam and Caffarella (1999) as “thinking through a situation after it has happened” (p. 235). Merriam and Caffarella comment that this process allows the exercise participants to gain new perspectives on their experiences. Additionally, it may offer the opportunity to effect changes in behavior, as trainer and trainees evaluate performance and review procedures used in the training exercise. This is the period when alternate operational options should be discussed. If appropriate, plans or standard operating procedures [SOPs] can be adjusted to reflect lessons learned from the mock training event.
Reflection in action, has been described as “Thinking on your feet” and “Keeping your wits about you” (Merriam and Cafarella, p. 236). In this process the individual is offered the opportunity to reflect back on their actions and reactions during the course of the exercise. Reflection in action may reveal that a course of action, previously thought viable, may not be the best option for action. Schon (1987) further elaborates that “We think critically about the thinking that got us into this fix or this opportunity; and we may, in the process, restructure strategies of action, understanding of phenomena, or ways of framing problems…Reflection gives rise to {the} on-the-spot experiment” (p. 28).

Both reflection on action [after the event has transpired] and reflection in action [during the actual event] are vital to the training process during an exercise. In both these venues a review phase or after action review the trainer and trainees use the opportunity to review their activities and responses during the exercise. It is during this critical review process that participants must voice any observations and concerns that surfaced in the training exercise. This allows for the sharing of experiences by the officers and may be helpful for the evaluation process that should occur after the exercise has been completed. Such questions as “what did we do that worked?” as well as “what did we do that did not work?” can provide both the trainer and the trainee new information and ideas that could be useful in the field and guide their responses in the event of an actual terrorist event. Additionally the lessons learned during such exercises may offer the campus administrator feedback which will aid them as they evaluate the appropriateness of their current written policies and procedure manuals regarding emergency situations on campus.
Recommendations

The proactive campus policing executive will perhaps be disappointed to learn that no matter how hard they may try to prevent an act of terrorism on campus, preventing such an attack by a determined terrorist group is nearly impossible. The required manpower and resources generally are not available to the campus administrator. Also, the many freedoms we enjoy as a part of our Constitution prohibit some security techniques that while effective antiterror techniques, could negate or diminish those cherished freedoms. In spite of these challenges, it is incumbent upon the campus policing administrator to take a proactive antiterrorism stance. The following recommendations are provided with the knowledge that the level of current antiterrorism preparedness will vary from campus to campus.

**Advance Planning and Preparedness**- Advance planning is imperative. Waiting until an event occurs may cause avoidable injuries and loss of life to first responders, faculty and staff, and other support responders. A part of this plan should include advance preparation for crowd control, to include students, campus staff, innocent bystanders, and onlookers who tend to appear at these types of events. Additionally, concerned parents will appear on campus in response to the release information by the media. A plan to meet the needs of these people with information is necessary to avoid interference with support and rescue duties. A key to dealing with parents and the media is designation of a knowledgeable individual as the official representative of the campus or command group. In the authors’ opinion all of the members of the campus from the administration to the students themselves should be
provided in advance with the most up-to-date information on what may be expected of them should a terrorist incident occur on their campus.

**Calculate the Risks**- When defense of an area is required one of the first things a soldier must do is calculate the risk. The same situation applies to the protection of a campus area by campus policing authorities. Only on rare occasions can every possible enemy approach into a defensive sector or area be guarded. Choices must be made as to what to defend and where to accept risk. Hindered by ever shrinking training and operating budgets and personnel shortages the campus administrator is forced to utilize available resources (personnel and equipment) in the most efficient manner.

**Attend Terrorism/Antiterrorism Classes**- There are also informative classes that the administrator, their campus officers, and other support personnel may choose to attend, such as the terrorism class offered by the IACLEA. This class is offered at various dates, times and locations virtually around the U.S. (see the IACLEA online website for the schedule regarding this class). A valuable listing of available terrorism training opportunities for officers and administrators may also be found at policetraining.net. This site is updated regularly with new information. Dialogue within any discipline, profession, or field of study is important. Security professionals that identify a training topic, terrorist trend, or viable lesson learned from an antiterrorist exercise should raise the subject within the venue. The IACLEA online website is an excellent way to give the widest dissemination to such information that could improve the preparedness of campuses in the United States.
**Review Available Subject Literature** - In response to the 911 Attacks and the subsequent War on Terror the United States Department of Defense [DOD] has developed the Service Members Training, Antiterrorism Level 1. This training is available on-line to DOD military and civilian members and their dependants. In fact service members are required to complete the unclassified Level 1 training annually. Level 1 training has four learning objectives that include: 1] the terrorist threat; 2] how to reduce vulnerability to a threat; 3] proper reaction to a threat; and 4] individual responsibility in unit security (DOD Service Members Training, Antiterrorism Level 1 [CONUS Version]).

There are also numerous websites available on the subject of terrorism which the campus security administrator may find useful to review for additional information regarding programs and other funding initiatives offered by both governmental and private organizations. For example, one privately run website, wmdfirstresponders.com, was created to “help improve the response capabilities of members assigned to organizations and agencies that could respond to attacks or events involving the use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive material)” (Jarboe, 2004). Another governmentally managed site is the Office for Domestic Preparedness [ODP] website at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/. The Office of Domestic Preparedness is a component of the Department of Homeland Security and responsible for preparing the United States for acts of terrorism. The ODP “is the primary office responsible for providing training, funds for the purchase of equipment, support for the planning and execution of exercises, technical assistance and other
support to assist states and local jurisdictions to prevent, plan for, and respond to acts of terrorism.” (Office of Domestic Preparedness, 2004).

**Develop a Written Plan**- A written plan, developed by a campus department, should not only outline the reactions of the police department and other emergency services, but should be inclusive of the rest of the campus personnel and students. The plan should also outline the expected actions of outside responding agencies, such as other law enforcement personnel, fire and rescue, and control of the news media. Individual or group meetings held regularly with these other agencies that would be expected to respond will also prove quite valuable to the campus police executive. A written agreement between agencies can also prove invaluable to all of the agencies who would be involved. Such an agreement should spell out their expected responsibilities during such an event on campus. Issues such as communications (telephonic and police and fire radio frequency coordination) should be worked out well in advance as each responder will utilize these methods of communications to report and advise of their duty area. In the May 2004 edition of “School Planning and Management”, Kollie wrote an informative article describing the response plan of the Montgomery County Public Schools system (Montgomery County, Alabama). This is one of the 20 largest school districts in the nation. Kollie (2004) reviews the given response elements which are a part of the district’s antiterrorism plan. This article may be used as a useful guide for the campus administrator who does not already have a written plan, or for the executive who may desire a review of their current written plan.
Perimeter Defensive/Operational Control - Controlled access to and from the campus should also be controlled to keep out media and other onlookers and to provide safe passage of additional support personnel responding to the incident. Access to the command center (possibly the campus policing headquarters or other secure area previously designated) should be monitored and controlled. A sufficient number of personnel assigned for that duty. Normally road access points are manned by campus or other responding law enforcement personnel. Depending on the location and extent of ground covered by the incident, crime tape or other available barrier material should be used to indicate the restricted area. The area surrounding the actual incident should be designated a red or hot zone and require proper authorization before entrance is allowed.

Provide Basic Instructions to Campus Personnel and Students - Information provided to the students and campus employees does not have to be overwhelming detail. Significant facts about the terrorists that threaten our way of life are appropriate. A few instructions reinforcing the need for all people to be vigilant in and around campus and to report suspicious activities to campus authorities are important. Simple personal protective actions to be taken in the case of an incident that could help avoid panic would also useful for both staff and students. Advisory notes as to where people can stage themselves during a disaster to await further clearance or instructions from campus policing authorities would provide valuable knowledge prior to any terrorist or other emergency incident on campus. Also, notification of pre-planned evacuation routes to be used if terrorists attack can provide parameters in which campus students and workers can help control a situation. Finally, the location of temporary
medical facilities for any injured student or campus employee in the event of such an attack would be useful.

Mock Training Exercises- The campus police executive should schedule antiterrorism training exercises for their campus organization. Responding to a real event on campus is expected to be rather chaotic. Very good information may be obtained through classroom training and review of outside written materials. However, nothing can take the place of the real time experience a mock training exercise can provide. This type of exercise is based on two types of learning theory central to live training exercises that were reviewed earlier in this article; problem based learning [PBL] and experiential learning.

Should lack of dedicated funds or lack of time make a full-up mock exercise impossible, then the use of “war gaming” or simulations can provide a cost effective alternative. This option is used extensively in the military prior to deployments and major exercises. War gaming and simulations are particularly useful to command and control and logistical elements. Such headquarters units are able to conduct internal and external coordination, plan employment of forces, develop logistical plans, and react to enemy action. All this can be accomplished with minimum staff and without the time and expense necessary to deploy, house, and maintain operational units.

Grants as Viable Sources of Training Funds- Of course the campus police executive should continuously seek out additional outside sources of funding needed to respond to acts of terrorism on campus. Seventy five percent of the campus police executives polled in this review stated that time and money were their two greatest deterrents from providing additional training to their departments officers. There are
current grants that are available to assist in the funding of additional personnel and equipment, many provided directly from such sources as the Department of Homeland Security (website: http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/) as well as various state sources (check your local state police website for possible grant opportunities) that have been provided discretionary funds for preparing responses to terrorism in the community. For example, by visiting the Department of Homeland Security website, choosing the category First Responders, then selecting “grants” the campus police executive can view upcoming grants that are available through the DHS. Also, there are often block grants available through your specific state coordinators website or a contact number should be available for those interested in reviewing grants on the state level for terrorism preparedness.

**Conclusion**

The 9/11 Commission pointed out the fanatical dedication of Islamist groups that pose a serious threat to America. The Islamist movement does not represent “a position with which Americans can bargain or negotiate. With it there is no common ground – not even with respect for life – on which to begin a dialogue. It can only be destroyed or utterly isolated” (2004, p. 362). This is the enemy which the campus police administrator and his officers face; the enemy which our society faces. “Private sector preparedness is not a luxury; it is a cost of doing business in the post 9/11 world” (9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 398). The 9/11 Commission Report states, “long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense” (2004, p. 363-364). There is little doubt that campus police administrators manage a critical part of the national assets that must be protected.
The purpose of this study was primarily to provide information to campus administration in an effort to encourage a regular review of their readiness to respond to a terrorist attack on campus. This was done through a review of the current readiness factors of various campus policing executives from around the nation, a short review of the history of terrorism movement, and through several recommendations on how to prepare the campus policing unit to react to a terrorist event through attending available terrorism training, the review of available subject literature, preparation of a written plan for response, controlling access to perimeter and operational areas, providing basic instructions to campus personnel and students, holding of mock training exercises, and finally recommendation for the campus police executive to seek local and federal grants to help offset funding, manpower, and equipment issues. The survey provides a framework within which an administrator can compare their specific campus’ state of readiness to that of various others across our nation. Additionally, the authors desired to press upon the administrator the fact that terrorism can happen on any campus, large or small, public or private, in Big Town USA to Small Town USA. Sadly, any school in America is a viable target for Islamist terrorist. Preparations to prevent and lessen the impact of such an event on the lives of our nation’s future should be of prime importance and should begin now.
References


Title 22, United States Code Section 2656f(d)).


