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# Homeland Security Strategic Plan for the Non-Major Local Law Enforcement Agency

Brad A. Halsey

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000

Non-Major Law Enforcement Agencies, Meta-Leadership, SAR Reporting, Collaboration, Intelligence-Led Policing

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Effectively implementing a homeland security program within police agencies labeled “non-major” in the United States is a challenge that requires different approaches from those that the large, or “major” departments employ. This research provides critical analysis leading to recommendations on how this important implementation can be accomplished without increasing the budget or personnel requirements within a given agency. Using a rigorous policy analytical framework and a representative case study approach, the findings coordinate and suggest how this process can fit into an agency’s plan to protect and respond to a community while successfully merging new and existing homeland security programs. The research finds that within a non-major police agency, the critical nodes for implementing effective homeland security hinge on an integrated leadership, communication and data collection synergy that leaders of these non-major departments can be taught and implement. This research contributes to the growing literature seeking to merge traditional law enforcement responsibilities with emerging homeland security requirements more effectively.
HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE
NON-MAJOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

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Deputy Chief of Police, Independence Missouri Police Department
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Effectively implementing a homeland security program within police agencies labeled “non-major” in the United States is a challenge that requires different approaches from those that the large, or “major” departments employ. This research provides critical analysis leading to recommendations on how this important implementation can be accomplished without increasing the budget or personnel requirements within a given agency. Using a rigorous policy analytical framework and a representative case study approach, the findings coordinate and suggest how this process can fit into an agency’s plan to protect and respond to a community while successfully merging new and existing homeland security programs. The research finds that within a non-major police agency, the critical nodes for implementing effective homeland security hinge on an integrated leadership, communication and data collection synergy that leaders of these non-major departments can be taught and implement. This research contributes to the growing literature seeking to merge traditional law enforcement responsibilities with emerging homeland security requirements more effectively.
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To the Cohort class of 1001–1002, your friendship will last a life time. This nation is fortunate to have such great homeland security leaders!
I. INTRODUCTION

Lord, I ask for courage—Courage to face and conquer my own fears. . . Courage to take me where others will not go. I ask for strength—Strength of body to protect others…Strength of spirit to lead others. I ask for dedication—Dedication to my job to do it well. Dedication to my community to keep it safe. Give me Lord, concern—Concern for others who trust me… And compassion for those who need me. . . And, please, Lord, through it all, be at my side.

A Police Officer’s Prayer—Author Unknown

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Following the events of September 11, 2001, the responsibilities of local law enforcement leaders changed overnight. The terrorist attacks forced a different level of thinking required by law enforcement leaders to keep their communities safe. Law enforcement leaders now must concern themselves with how they can better prepare their police departments and community from the threat of terrorism. Law enforcement leaders should consider if their leadership ability will adequately meet the necessary skills in meeting these expectations. The threat of street level criminals impacting the community’s safety is now interchangeable with the reality that terrorists are willing and capable of inflicting a much larger scale of devastation. Are law enforcement leaders capable of leading the community from a state of shock and fear to a state of prevention, recovery, or resilience if or when a terrorist attack occurs in their community?

Since 9/11, law enforcement agencies continue to try to discern how their agencies can add homeland security practices to the roles in which they already provide within their communities. One of the challenges that continue to face smaller police agencies across the nation is the fact that police departments not classified as a “major” police department, do not receive federal funding to start or sustain homeland security programs. If money is not available to non-major law enforcement agencies, alternative strategies must be considered to implement and sustain new programs. Non-major police departments typically do not have the number of police officers found within local police
departments considered “major.” Major police departments can often shift personnel resources within the organization to start new programs or alter policing strategies. Smaller agencies do not have this luxury and often cannot start new programs unless the program includes federal grant money for the hiring of new officers. It is unreasonable to suggest or recommend that every local police department receive federal funding for homeland security. This sentiment does not dismiss the fact that citizens expect their police departments to provide a safe and secure community regardless of how the department accomplishes the mission.

The majority of police departments in the United States have 10 officers or less. If these smaller police agencies decide that they want to perform homeland security practices within their jurisdictions, they must find a way to do so without disrupting current services provided to the community. Since it is common for non-major law enforcement agencies to adopt policing strategies used by major police agencies, which homeland security strategies being conducted by the major police departments can be implemented by non-major law enforcement agencies using existing resources available to them? Can this philosophy be applied to increase the security of non-major policing communities?

According to the Major Cities Chiefs Organization website, a “major” police department is categorized by the following criteria.

Membership in the Major Cities Chiefs is designed to reflect the public safety needs and unique crime problems of the largest policing agencies in the United States and Canada. Police executives who meet one of the following criteria are eligible for membership:

A. “Major cities” means (a) the largest 50 cities in the United States based on population as determined by the latest annual census update, and (b) the largest 7 cities in Canada based on population as determined by the latest annual census update.

B. “Major metropolitan areas” means those metropolitan areas with a residential population of at least 1.5 million, and whose largest law enforcement agency is comprised of at least 1,000 sworn law enforcement officers. (Major Cities Chiefs Police Police Organization, 2011, About Section)
A study initiated by the International Association of Chiefs of Police is underway to determine the definition of a police department often overlooked by the federal government in terms of funding support for programs, such as homeland security initiatives (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010). For the purposes of this thesis, any municipal law enforcement agency that does not receive federal funding to support homeland security programs is considered a “non-major” law enforcement agency and labeled as non-major. Non-major law enforcement agencies that do not receive federal or state funding to initiate a homeland security program are left with few options in how their agencies can participate in the nation’s homeland security efforts. Many of these agencies are experiencing reductions in their budgets and personnel while facing increasing incidents of violent crime and disorder within their community. In 2006, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) concluded the following:

Local law enforcement is struggling with its new role and responsibilities in handling counterterrorism issues while maintaining its crime prevention and control duties. As budgets for traditional crime control have been tightened, law enforcement faces significant increases in the type and volume of service it must provide to keep citizens safe from violence and from vague, ongoing terrorist threat. Local law enforcement is working to be included in state homeland security plans and competing for funds with other first responders, all while developing or coordinating new homeland security efforts such as creating intelligence functions that will aid in terrorism prevention. (Davies, Plotkin, Filler, Flynn, Foresman, Litzinger, McCarthy, & Wiseman, 2005, p. 42)

The statement released from PERF in 2006 remains true today for most local law enforcement agencies across the nation. Federal funding is minimal and primarily allocated for major police agencies. Recognizing the importance of this issue, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) recently announced the organization’s support for the National Criminal Justice Commission Act (S. 714) (Carroll, 2011). The National Criminal Justice Commission Act is intended to analyze law enforcement challenges and provide recommendations for changes.

Local law enforcement agencies cannot rely on pending legislation to determine strategies on how their agencies can participate in the nation’s homeland security efforts. With the successful passage of this legislation, it may take several years to determine if
this initiative provides answers to the current local law enforcement dilemma. According to a 2010 report released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the nation’s homeland security success depends largely on the ability of local and state government entities ability to execute the core homeland security mission activities (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2010a). Since the missions are much broader than DHS is capable of executing, it is imperative non-major police agencies become involved.

Based upon conversations with several non-major law enforcement police chiefs, a review of other non-major law enforcement agencies, and a search of numerous databases, no existing models or strategies are available for non-major law enforcement agencies to implement that would strengthen their homeland security efforts. Law enforcement leaders, within non-major law enforcement agencies, are facing shrinking budgets, personnel shortages, and emerging problems with street level crimes and disorder in their communities. These agencies do not have answers on how their organizations can effectively deploy homeland security strategies without increasing the number of employees, which directly affects the department’s budget allocation.

In summary, the problem this research addresses is a need to provide non-major law enforcement executives with a strategy to enable the implementation of homeland security practices that consider budget and personnel limitations.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

What strategies can non-major law enforcement agencies implement to strengthen America’s homeland security using the organizations current manpower and budget allocation to prevent future terrorist attacks in the United States?

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this literature review is to determine what, if any, strategies non-major law enforcement agencies can implement to participate in homeland security using their current resources to prevent future terrorist attacks within the United States. This analysis of homeland security literature is closely examined for information that
establishes responsibilities placed upon non-major municipal law enforcement agencies within homeland security. Another purpose of this literature review is to provide the researcher and the reader with an understanding on what homeland security strategies are occurring within the United States and abroad. The purpose of this review is then to use this information to determine how these practices can be implemented in police agencies concerned they do not have the personnel resources or budget to accomplish similar strategies. Thus, the primary goal was to locate a single source strategy document that a police chief of a non-major agency can implement within the respective agency without adding personnel or a significant increase to the organization’s budget.

This literature review is grouped into two categories. The first category includes federal government publications, national strategies and other national documents. The purpose of reviewing federal publications is to determine what, if any, strategies or programs the national government mandates for local law enforcement agencies. If national strategies or programs already exist, local law enforcement agencies may utilize federal funding to help support or sustain future programs. Another advantage of determining if existing federal guidelines are already established for local police agencies to follow, is maintaining a certain element of consistency within the various local law enforcement agencies across the nation on how the programs are conducted and reported. The second category consists of information provided by nationally recognized law enforcement organizations, such as the IACP and PERF. Local law enforcement agencies rely heavily on these organizations to provide leadership in addressing problems or concerns that face local police agencies. The nationally recognized law enforcement organizations provide analysis of problems local police agencies face and then provide alternative solutions that departments can adopt to serve their agency and community alike better.

After conducting this process, the review failed to provide a single source document that included a clear, concise strategy document for non-major police chiefs to engage their officers and community successfully towards a terrorism prevention strategy. At best, several of the documents served as a general guideline; however, a
police chief would need to dedicate time and energy to understand and formulate specific homeland security strategies that do not require adding personnel or without asking for additional funds to support programs.

The *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* report states, “State, local, tribal, and territorial governments are on the front lines of our efforts to secure our homeland, and are the first responders to incidents of all types. A coordinated approach that promotes unity of effort will provide the strongest foundation for the homeland security’s enterprise’s efforts to combat current, emerging, and future threats to the homeland. To achieve unity of effort, partners will need clearly defined roles and responsibilities” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2010b). Prevention is a common word found in homeland security national strategies. The *Quadrennial* report notes the “cornerstone” of the nation’s homeland security efforts is directly related to “prevention” efforts (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2010b). It is the responsibility of non-major police departments to derive a plan to insure public safety no matter the cost or considerations of personnel resources. However, like most agencies, large or small, budgets define police agencies and what police services are provided. Thus, non-major police departments must be creative and resourceful to sustain public security and safety. Terrorists can reside or target any community, regardless of its size or population.

1. **Professional Law Enforcement Organizations Documents—Defining Non-Major Municipal Law Enforcement Agency**

   Within the selected government and professional organization publications reviewed, only one document, authored by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, attempted to define a non-major law enforcement agency and the distinct differences between smaller and larger agencies. The U.S. Department of Justice published the report in collaboration with the International Association of Chiefs of Police in March 2010. Interestingly, the committee members assigned to the policy research group did not agree on a single definition of a non-major police agency (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010).
The definition on how a police agency is categorized is significant based upon the future funding considerations of the federal government. For example, the Independence Missouri Police Department is not considered a “major” police department due to population and number of commissioned officers. The City of Independence borders the city limits of Kansas City, Missouri and frequently experiences the same types of crimes committed by the same offenders. Due to the size differences of the organizations, the Kansas City Missouri Police Department staffing allows for the formation of various homeland security units that the City of Independence is unable to staff, such as the Kansas City Terrorism Early Warning fusion center. Unless cities similar to the City of Independence, Missouri receive federal funding to implement homeland security programs, these agencies are forced to identify and implement programs using current personnel resources and funding.

2. National Strategy Documents

The role of local law enforcement agencies on matters of national security cannot be underestimated. Local law enforcement serves as the front line of defense for the nation (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005). Local law enforcement provides police officers in virtually every community found within this nation, and as history proves, terrorists have lived in smaller communities and targeted larger, adjacent communities as did several of the 9/11 hijackers who resided in California prior to executing the terror plots. It is imperative that every non-major law enforcement agency determine how it can implement strategies to strengthen homeland security within its communities to prevent future acts of terrorism.

When determining the homeland security role of local police, it is important to determine why local law enforcement leaders look to the federal government for these answers. Since the first national strategy was published in 2002, the federal government has taken a leadership role in forming a national homeland security program. For example, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security states, “While law enforcement agencies will continue to investigate and prosecute criminal activity, they should now assign priority to preventing and interdicting terrorist activity within the
United States” (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. xi). The problem with this statement is that the federal government provides no guidance or funding to ensure that this strategy is successful. While each law enforcement agency is different, it must first insure that basic police services are met before addressing larger homeland security issues.

Following the 2002 report, the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security was released. As noted in this report, the purpose of the 2007 Strategy is to, “guide, organize, and unify our Nation’s homeland security efforts” (Office of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 1). Again, this strategy states the overall goal; however, the strategy once again fails to provide specific guidance on how non-major local law enforcement agencies meet these expectations within their budget and personnel resources.

The Quadrennial Homeland Security Strategy released in 2010, states, “The purpose of this QHSR is to outline the strategic framework to guide the activities of participants in homeland security toward a common end” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2010b, p. iii). Without specific strategies and outside funding sources, non-major law enforcement agencies are again left with the problem of determining what, if any, strategies can be accomplished with existing resources and funding to prevent future terrorist attacks.

The 2002, 2007, and the 2010 national strategy reports provide local law enforcement agencies with broad, visionary goals to establish a nationwide homeland security strategy. The strategies fail to provide non-major municipal law enforcement agencies with any suggestions or specific strategies on how they can successfully implement homeland security practices within their organizations to meet these objectives. When the federal government issues a national strategy, the government needs to provide additional information on how law enforcement agencies can achieve the strategies. If the federal government leads the homeland security strategy of the nation, then it makes logical sense that federal documents should be created to assist agencies in meeting the established guidelines. All three national strategies place municipal police
agencies into one category—local. Local law enforcement agencies across the nation differ in many facets; number of officers, budget allocation including grant assistance, and internal and external challenges facing the organization.

The National Response Framework (NRF) released in 2008, replaces the former National Response Plan (NRP). The NRF boasts the many improvements made in the national response structures since the issuance of the NRP (Office of Homeland Security, 2008). The NRF report is a start in providing guiding principles for local law enforcement to establish a unified national “response” to disasters; however, this report fails to consider “how” local police agencies implement these principles. The National NRF report is based solely on “response” guidelines. Therefore, the report fails to provide an established “prevention” guideline for non-major police agencies so that they fully understand their role in the homeland security effort.

It might be expected to find guidance from the National Security Strategy (NSS) for non-major municipal law enforcement to help define its role in homeland security. The latest NSS report, published May of 2010, states, “To prevent acts of terrorism on American soil, we must enlist all of our intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security capabilities” (The White House, 2010, p. 20).

The NSS report encourages the various levels of law enforcement to improve intelligence and communications using Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) and fusion centers. However, the report fails to specify additional prevention strategies and how these fit into the non-major police agency role of homeland security.

In July 2010, the federal government released the Bottom–Up Review Report (BUR) of the nation’s homeland security strategy. When speaking on strengthening DHS’s mission areas in this report, improving DHS operations and management, and increasing DHS accountability, Secretary Janet Napolitano states, “The BUR will serve as a road map for these questions. First and foremost, it provides direction for reinforcing the cornerstone of homeland security: preventing terrorism” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2010a, p. iv). Non-major police agencies will not find answers about how they can implement homeland security policies and achieve homeland security goals.
using existing resources within this report. The BUR is similar to the preceding Quadrennial report, in that it provided broad national strategies but failed to provide non-major law enforcement agencies with strategies that can be implemented without increasing personnel or budgets.

If the nation desires to develop a strategy that unifies efforts and builds collaboration between the community and the various agencies, single source easily understood documents must be readily available to decision makers. Law enforcement executives that lack experience within the homeland security field may be more inclined to implement programs if single source documents are available for their review. The materials addressed during this literature review were found to be long, comprehensive, and lacking specific details needed to ensure that local law enforcement could participate in homeland security without increasing manpower or funding within the organizations.

3. Professional Law Enforcement Organizations Documents

Professional law enforcement organizations, such as IACP and PERF, routinely publish studies that analyze the challenges facing law enforcement agencies. The IACP is a preeminent leader for law enforcement agencies across the nation. In a 2008 article, former IACP President Ronald Ruecker stated, “The prevention of terrorist attacks must be viewed as the paramount priority in any national, state, tribal, or local homeland security strategy. Unfortunately, to date, the vast majority of federal homeland security efforts have focused on increasing national capabilities to respond to and recover from a terrorist attack.” (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2008, p. 6). Since federal funding is being used for the prevention and response aspect, it is essential that non-major law enforcement agencies look within to build a framework that will provide its community with a strategic approach to the growing threat of terrorism.

In 2003, PERF released the first of six publications entitled, Protecting Your Community from Terrorism (Murphy, Plotkin, Flynn, Perlov, Stafford, & Stephens, 2003). Combined, these volumes provide a comprehensive summary of homeland security issues facing municipal law enforcement agencies across the nation. The six volumes provide police executives a broad range of information concerning homeland
security issues that local law enforcement agencies should consider when developing a homeland security plan. Since the publications cover a multitude of homeland security topics, the information is broad and serves, at best, a guide for police executives. Although these publications provide police executives within the non-major law enforcement agencies a broad knowledge of homeland security strategies, additional information is required for these executives to determine how their organizations can implement homeland security policies and achieve homeland security goals using existing resources. These publications fail to provide a single source document that a non-major law enforcement executive can read and understand what it is possible to do today to implement homeland security strategies without increasing their budgets, negatively impacting basic police services, or increasing manpower to implement strategies.

This analysis shows that inadequate strategic guidance exists for non-major law enforcement agencies to implement at all levels of review. Furthermore, this literature review demonstrates that non-major law enforcement executives across the nation do not have a single source strategy document that demonstrates what they can do without negatively affecting the organizations budget and what can be accomplished with their current personnel resources. Subsequently, non-major law enforcement executives may be missing the necessary strategies to increase participation in the nation’s homeland security practices. Law enforcement executives who look at national strategies to provide answers will find only general principles that do not consider how programs impact personnel resources or limited budgets. At best, the national strategies provide a framework for agencies to use in establishing overall homeland security goals. While the national strategies provide the overarching goals, they lack specific plans or details on how to achieve the goals. Establishing specific strategies that can be shared by all police agencies, regardless of their size, is difficult, if not impossible to achieve. A “one-size” fit all approach is very difficult because local police agencies are so different. Different political views, personnel, cultures, budgets and community involvement direct the
operations of non-major law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement executives must decide what police services can be offered to the community within specific budgets and available personnel resources.

The professional law enforcement organizations offer guiding principles for law enforcement executives; however, they also find it difficult to find a “one-size” fits all answer in determining how non-major law enforcement agencies can effectively implement homeland security practices. While the professional organizations support homeland security programs, they have yet to provide specific information on how this can be accomplished. The decision on what strategies to implement and how to implement them is left to the chiefs of police of non-major law enforcement agencies. The inability of the International Association of Chiefs of Police’s committee to agree on the definition of what a mid-size police agency demonstrates the difficulty in determining the differences found within local law enforcement agencies. Identifying and articulating specific homeland security practices for implementation by these organizations must continue as new initiatives are developed.

As previously stated, professional organizations, such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police, are attempting to identify the different size classifications of local law enforcement agencies. This effort will help identify how the agency size and location can create different problems so that potential solutions can be sought. No specific guidelines have been located in this review to address what strategies non-major law enforcement agencies should implement to strengthen America’s homeland security using current manpower and budget allocations.

Several other concerns were identified during the literature reviews relevant to the successful implementation of strategies within non-major law enforcement agencies.

- The lack of leadership training for current and future homeland security leaders now facing the threat of terrorism within their communities
- Following a large scale terrorism attack, first responders and citizens may experience fear and anxiety
- Failure of law enforcement executives to address these psychological effects can inhibit the ability of the nation to recover
Although this study is not focused solely on leadership and the psychological effects of terrorism, the education of current and future homeland security leaders in both of these areas will benefit the nation’s homeland security efforts. Educating law enforcement executives what psychological responses can affect personnel and the community strengthens the leader’s efficiency and effectiveness during prevention, response and recovery efforts.

**D. HYPOTHESIS**

This research begins with the hypothesis that, for an increase in participation of local law enforcement agencies to practice homeland security strategies, law enforcement executives must be provided a clear, defined guide demonstrating that homeland security strategies can be implemented in their respected organizations without an increase in budget or personnel resources. The analysis of relevant literature shows that this hypothesis is reasonable to make and using an accepted academic methodology, described below, this research will be helpful to non-major law enforcement agencies to prevent future terrorist attacks. For the country to increase the non-major law enforcement agencies efficiency and effectiveness in the prevention and protection of America, local law enforcement executives must understand what strategies exist that can be implemented without a budget increase, how these strategies can be implemented within the organization, and how these efforts increase the nation’s homeland security efforts.

One of the reasons this issue is important for the nation is that many local law enforcement agencies across the nation do not receive federal funding to participate in homeland security. Therefore, this prevents the participation of many of these departments. Many law enforcement executives are experiencing budget cuts, which forces employee lay offs that further complicate executive’s decisions to implement homeland security practices. Furthermore, law enforcement executives fear that implementing homeland security practices will negatively impact the ability to meet basic police services within their community. For the nation to sustain and increase homeland
security participation in the future, law enforcement executives must understand that homeland security strategies can be implemented using existing resources and may do so without depleting current budget allocations.

This research provides non-major law enforcement executives with a strategy document that will fill this existing gap. This document provides non-major executives with specific strategies that can be implemented within their organization with little to no cost and uses existing resources within the organization. Specifically, this thesis explores which strategies, policies, or programs meet the following criteria for immediate implementation.

- Low or no cost to the organization
- Can be implemented using existing personnel or without serious impact to current levels of basic police services
- The strategy(s) strengthen community collaboration with the police department

E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To address the research question focused on how non-major law enforcement agencies can participate in America’s homeland security without increasing the organization’s funding or personnel to prevent future terrorist attacks, this thesis uses a case study as the primary methodology for analysis. The study evaluates national homeland security strategies, national homeland security initiatives, and other law enforcement agencies’ “best practices” regarding homeland security strategies in relation to how the case study department can effectively implement these strategies. In this regard, the research also uses analytical frameworks commonly associated with policy analysis as it seeks to uncover those policies systematically that can be effectively implemented in non-major police departments. While the research uses one non-major police department to illustrate the policy analysis, many of the findings are generalizable to some degree and with intimate knowledge of another specific non-major department, a leader would be able to use these findings to implement sustainable homeland security policies more effectively.
The Independence Missouri Police Department serves as the basis of this case study. The Independence Missouri Police Department is considered a non-major local law enforcement agency for many of the reasons outlined above, such as size proximity to other large departments and population served. This department is an effective case study for this research for several reasons. First, the department Chief of Police, Tom Dailey, has publically stated that an urgent need exists to identify additional strategies that can strengthen the community’s security, as well of the security of the nation. In particular, this identification by the Chief of Police noted that sustainable policies would need to consider the distinctions made above between major and non-major departments. This research is aware that not all the findings will be applicable to all states and localities—the great diversity of state and local laws and cultures are both a strength for the country and a challenge to national strategic implementation. However, it is clear that the distinction between major and non-major departments must be explored and the willingness of the case study department to open itself to research makes it ideal as a place to begin this important work.

Within the last few years, the Independence Missouri Police Department implemented different strategies that are proving effective. However, it appears the organization may have the ability to strengthen current strategies to prevent future terrorist attacks using the results of this study. This study will benefit other non-major law enforcement agencies in their quest to prevent future terrorist attacks in their community using existing resources and with little or no cost to the organization.

The Independence Missouri Police Department serves a 78 square mile jurisdiction in the heart of the country. The state of Missouri has divergent political and ethic diversity. The City of Independence is located within Jackson County. Sixty-seven percent of the population served is White, 24% African American, 2% Asian, 1% American Indian and Alaskan Native Alone, >1% Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Alone, 4% Unidentified and 3% Multi-Racial (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). The Independence Missouri Police Department is the second largest police department in
Jackson County, with Kansas City Missouri Police Department being the largest. The department employs 203 commissioned police officers. Of these, 93% are male and 7% are female.

Obviously, different regions’ non-major departments are comprised of personnel that reflect their service area populations, but the case study focuses on those areas of policy analysis more easily transferable from one region and to another. For instance, leadership style or the effective implementation of community oriented policing or intelligence led policing strategies might vary from the case study department in local specifics—but the policies and ideas in general are transferable from one non-major department to another.

In relation to the case study discussed above, specific policies are analyzed in an effort to discern those strategies and policies that comprise the most important set upon which non-major departments should focus. Government reports, academic research, and advocacy reports pertaining to law enforcement homeland security strategies are closely examined to identify strengths and weaknesses, existing gaps, and policies, which inhibit law enforcement executive’s decision to participate in homeland security practices.

Based on analysis of information (see literature review for details), this study presents a framework for law enforcement executives to implement homeland security strategies within their organizations using existing resources and within current budget allocations. Importantly, the framework that emerges from this research is reflected against the case study department to illustrate how these efforts might actually unfold in a real life situation.

The thesis is further developed through drawing on the collection of data regarding homeland security best practices and the findings that frame recommendations for non-major police agencies to utilize as a guide to implement strategies within their respected organizations. The method is therefore intertwined with the extant theoretical literature while always abducting with the reality of temporal concerns each non-major department must face as it considers executing this essential but difficult task in the current threat environment.
II. BUILDING LEADERS AND THE COMMUNITY

A. INTRODUCTION

Building leaders within a community is like piecing together a large puzzle. Like puzzles, the sides, the shapes, and other attributes differ from piece to piece. One piece can look similar and fit easily with another piece. Yet, one piece is always difficult to find and can hold the whole process from completion. Meta-leadership holds many pieces to a very complicated puzzle. These pieces interlock to help create a picture of public safety and aid in the way to organize how a community responds to a possible tragedy or any catastrophic event.

Complex, large-scale events that inflict death, devastation, and chaos can challenge even the most experienced homeland security leaders or the largest and most-well trained or equipped departments. Large-scale incidents require momentous response from all corners of the nation: government entities, private businesses, and nonprofit organizations. To aid homeland security, leaders in their response to complex, large-scale incidents of terrorism or manmade disasters, must possess effective communication skills that encourage collaborative efforts between various organizations responding to such incidents. The community expects its city leaders to possess the necessary training and expertise to prepare, respond, and lead recovery efforts properly following a catastrophic event. According to the book *Psychology of Terrorism*, “Pre-event organized activities can have enormous impact on public trust, and perceptions of trust can mitigate the impact of negativity bias and heightened feelings of fear and vulnerability (Bongar, Brown, Beutler, Breckenridge, & Zimbardo, 2007, p. 128).

Failure in any of these areas of responsibilities can result in the loss of human life and long-term psychological distress within the community or within the organization responsible for response and recovery efforts.

For the purpose of this research, the term homeland security includes any manmade or natural disaster requiring response from multiple entities.
Key city leaders include department directors from the following city departments: city manager’s office, city council, finance, fire, health, law, police, power and light, public works, technology services, water, and water pollution control.

B. META-LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT

According to the meta-leadership developers, the lack of communication between the police department and the fire department resulted in the loss of human lives during the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks (Marcus, Dorn, & Henderson, 2006). During the development of a leadership program entitled, *National Preparedness Leadership Initiative*, Harvard Professor Leonard J. Marcus, along with Harvard Professor Barry C. Dorn, developed the term meta-leadership. This program suggests that homeland security leaders who are educated and trained to enhance skills necessary will improve the nation's preparation, response, and recovery efforts (Marcus et al., 2006). Meta-leadership is defined as “A new brand of leadership that challenges individuals to think and act cooperatively across organizations and sectors. Meta-Leaders operate outside the scope of their traditional professional boundaries, providing inspiration, guidance and momentum for a course of action that spans organizational lines” (CDC Foundation, 2010, About Section). Meta-leadership skills that educate leaders in bringing various government and non-government entities together during large-scale responses is offered through private and academic organizations. Harvard School of Public Health offers a (10) day program entitled, *National Preparedness Leadership Initiative*, which focuses on meta-leadership training. During this 10-day program, homeland security leaders are “Trained to strategically and consistently link assets, operations, and resources to achieve connectivity in preparing for or responding to an emergency” (CDC Foundation, 2010, Overview Section). The curriculum for this course advertises, “The National Preparedness Leadership Initiative Executive Education program is designed to build capacity for heightened cross-government and cross-sector coordination of effort Meta-leadership in both preparedness and response” (CDC Foundation, 2010, Curriculum Section).
According to the National Preparedness Leadership Initiative of Harvard University, meta-leadership consists of five principles. (Figure 1)

C. SUMMARY OF THE FIVE DIMENSIONS

The following paragraphs summarize the five dimensions of meta-leadership (Marcus et al., 2007).

Figure 2. Summary of Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership. (From: Marcus et al., 2007)
1. The Person

A meta-leader demonstrates self-awareness through the identification of someone’s own strengths and weaknesses. Self-control, motivation, understanding and social skills are additional traits of the meta-leader. When faced with stressful situations, a meta-leader recognizes it is essential to act quickly and take immediate command and control of the situation. Immediate command and control of the situation by the leader demonstrates to others that the meta-leader is in charge and capable of getting everyone to work towards solutions. Meta-leaders are driven by visions and goals, which often reach outside of their own organizations. This vision, or bigger picture thinking, requires the meta-leader to be a leader within the leader’s own organization, and a leader of those over who the leader has no formal command and authority, or other jurisdictions, profit, and non-profit organizations. The accomplishment of goals is not for oneself, but for a much larger cause. Of these traits, the ability to influence others bears the most significance.

2. The Situation

This dimension is the ability of meta-leaders to filter information and accurately determine what the problem is. After the problem is determined, meta-leaders must formulate the proper response and then take decisive action. Situational awareness, during complex problem solving situations, allows the meta-leader to anticipate future problems, formulate responses, and make proactive decisions to lessen or avoid additional problems. During complex, large-scale problem solving, situational awareness is critical for the meta-leader. If the meta-leader lacks the ability to ascertain exactly what the problem is, unnecessary manpower and/or resources may be wasted. During complex problems, situations often change, which requires the meta-leader to recognize the change, adapt and overcome. This characteristic is considered the most important leadership trait associated with situation. The ability to factor actual, perceived, and unknown threats provides the meta-leader with opportunities to formulate calculated risks during the decision-making process. During complex, large-scale catastrophic events, meta-leaders need to consider what actions their own organization should take coupled
with how other organizations will be affected by these decisions. Finally, the meta-leader possesses self-confidence. Self-confidence provides the meta-leader with the courage necessary to take the driver’s seat while realizing not everyone will agree with the decisions made. How do meta-leaders gain the trust and respect necessary to gain followers? According to meta-leadership, meta-leaders must lead the silo.

3. **Lead the Silo**

Establishing credibility and respect as a meta-leader within the meta-leader’s own organization will help build credibility with the community and with other organizations and sectors outside the meta-leader’s command and authority. This development becomes especially important for the collaboration efforts between the meta-leader’s organization, the community and outside organizations and entities. If the meta-leader is able to gain the necessary support from within, and outside of the meta-leader’s organization, determining goals, or shared visions, becomes a balancing act for the meta-leader. While developing shared goals, the meta-leader recognizes it is essential to understand the different cultures or missions of the various agencies involved and the community, which the meta-leader serves. Analyzing how each organization fits into the mission and how each can contribute to the success of reaching the goals will help link the various groups together.

4. **Lead Up**

Influence is shaped by informing and educating someone’s supervisor, which requires the meta-leader to keep the boss informed of pertinent information, good or bad. Leading-up includes educating the supervisor at every opportunity to build the supervisor’s competence level and to demonstrate that of the meta-leader’s, which does not require the employee to demonstrate blind loyalty. Demonstrating dependability, honesty, reliability and loyalty towards the boss may provide opportunities for the meta-leader to promote and pursue the meta-leader’s ideas and proposals. The meta-leader’s efforts are for the greater cause, not for self-recognition and status. The meta-leader influences the boss using this process. The meta-leader may not work directly with
elected or appointed officials so the meta-leader’s ideas and programs are communicated via bosses. Building relationships with other organizations and the community takes time and energy. The meta-leader recognizes this and understands that without the boss’s support, it will be difficult, if not impossible to accomplish.

5. Lead Across

This dimension is accomplished by providing leadership and communication necessary to bring outside agencies and the community together. The meta-leader combines the resources and efforts of participating organizations and the community together to build additional resources, therefore, having the capability to accomplish more than ever before. Building on relationships, before a tragedy strikes, enables the meta-leader to facilitate meetings so that available resources can be identified, sharing this information with others, and working through exercises with the involved groups. Having the courage to step out front and make things happen separates the meta-leader from others within the organization. This effort will require the meta-leader to have patience and persistence.

D. ANALYSIS OF META-LEADERSHIP AND MINIMIZING ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES: CAN THIS MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

During the course of this study, the author’s intention was to determine the core meaning of meta-leadership and analyze how this leadership philosophy can impact leadership during a crisis and the potential psychological consequences following a complex, large-scale incident within a community. Meta-leadership is unique in two areas, (1) facilitates communication and direction within the community, private entities and across organizational boundaries, and (2) encourages leaders to act [lead] for the advancement of organizations outside of their control as well as their own.

The meta-leadership theory bridges homeland security and leadership using a consistent message that homeland security leaders must improve communication and collaboration within and outside of their own organizations for the purpose of planning, preparing, and collaborating efforts. Three common themes emerge with regard to
lessons learned following a catastrophic event occurring within the nation: (1) the need for improved communication/collaboration within the various homeland security organizations, (2) strong leadership skills are required to resolve complex situations to reduce fear and anxiety, and (3) how politics (local, state, or federal politicians) can interfere with homeland security preparation, response, and recovery efforts. Meta-leadership philosophies relates to all three of these gaps within its five dimensions.

Does meta-leadership work? If so, how is this measured? Does measurable success really matter? What constitutes successful preparation, response, and recovery in homeland security? This topic, similar to “what is the definition of homeland security,” is a matter of opinion and very subjective in discussions among non-professionals. To date, no academic case studies have been conducted on the effectiveness of meta-leadership, or a correlation of this philosophy and the reduction of adverse psychological consequences. However, Professor Marcus points to United States Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen as a successful meta-leader by stating:

He [Allen] had to engage a number of political leaders and other agencies to coordinate a vast array of activity, and he was really good about reaching out, engaging, listening, and trying to make sure that everybody was strategically moving in the same direction. (Straw, 2010, Magazine Section)

The meta-leader strategy provides a methodology for homeland security leaders to increase communications and collaboration both within and outside of their respected organizations and within the communities they serve. Applying the meta-leadership philosophy to non-major police agencies is foundational for creating a needed common language between departments, as well the community leaders and citizens. Homeland security is a huge challenge that seems difficult to place within this puzzle without some similar leadership framework, which allows a multidiscipline approach with common vision and understanding. It is essential that non-major agencies provide a service to their community to ensure safety from terrorism while keeping in mind budget and personnel allowances. If regional key leaders—as defined above—can agree to pursue meta-leadership methods, the implementation of other important policies and strategies can be more effectively implemented.
Meta-leadership is a philosophy that organizations should incorporate to educate and promote communication and collaboration of efforts within and outside of the organization. According to the book entitled, *Psychology of Terrorism*, engaging the public so that “…the views and practices of communities and their possible responses could inform response and recovery strategies, as well as education and preparedness strategies” (Bongar, Brown, Beutler, Breckenridge, & Zimbardo, 2007, p. 187). This brief analysis of the utility of meta-leadership principles addresses the active engagement of the public as suggested and creates the possibility for an environment in which more effective homeland security policies can be implemented in non-major departments.

E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS—META-LEADERSHIP

While meta-leadership is just a philosophy, individual leaders or organizations need to decide to pursue and practice the five dimensions of meta-leadership. This commitment will better prepare communities across the nation for more effective homeland security effectiveness. Organizations— and where possible, regions—must constantly pursue the concept of building a cadre of homeland security professionals in a unified manner. The meta-leadership philosophy provides a foundation for homeland security leaders to educate and prepare themselves for how they can make improvements with regard to their responsibilities related to the emerging world of homeland security concerns.

Communication and collaboration efforts framed in the five meta-leadership dimensions will “…reduce psychological casualties by increasing the public’s confidence and sense of mastery and reducing fear through communicating convincingly to the public that the community is ready in the event of a bioterrorism event” (Butler, Panzer, & Goldfrank, 2003, p. 106). This concept is key to every aspect necessary for effective leadership through difficult budgetary and political situations leaders face as they work to more effectively prepare their departments for the homeland security environment non-major departments’ face.
The proactive nature of the meta-leadership philosophy reaches both within and outside of the organization to increase communication and collaboration effectiveness while strengthening the preparedness, response and recovery efforts. As Breckenridge and Zambardo suggest, “It is essential that government leadership make every effort to ‘take the terror out of terrorism’ by deploying programs to address the psychosocial processes that underlie public perceptions before, during, and after a terrorist emergency” (Bongar et al., 2007, p. 127). The five meta-leadership dimensions meet that challenge effectively.

Meta-leadership provides an avenue for homeland security practitioners to reduce adverse psychological consequences within their community by increasing communication and collaboration efforts from within and across organizational boundaries while empowering the community to become involved with the process. This philosophy provides non-major police departments that necessary framework to encourage collaboration between police officials, other stakeholders in the community and citizens in general. While not always painless, collaboration is cheap; it is financed through effective communication. That communication when properly documented, will help departments effectively and efficiently use existing personnel and make decisions that directly impact citizens and the community in which they live.

Meta-leadership is the base upon which non-major departments should build their homeland security framework and implementation in a highly budget constrained world.
III. POST 9/11 CHALLENGES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

A. BUDGET CONSTRAINTS

According to a 2008 article published in *Public Budgeting & Finance*, “Many local governments today are experiencing revenue shortfalls, especially in the critical area of emergency management where expectations exceed revenue realities. Emergency management systems are subject to rising costs, unfunded mandates, and greater service expectation” (MacManus & Caruson, 2008). “The continuous threat of terrorism has thrust domestic preparedness obligations to the very top of law enforcement agenda. For today’s law enforcement executive, the capacity must be considered as much a staple of law enforcement operations as crime analysis, criminal intelligence, and crime prevention” (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005, p. vi).

Following the year 2001 and looking forward, law enforcement, particularly local law enforcement, has been on the front lines of terrorism. The democratic society in which Americans live places an “enormous degree of responsibility and authority for public security…” and this authority historically is delegated to local governments and the police agencies working for them (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2001, p. 5). Due to the current economic times, many law enforcement executives feel pressured now, more than ever, on meeting the needs of the community with scarce resources. According to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, one of the most significant concerns facing non-major law enforcement executives today is the issue of terrorism prevention (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2001). In the United States, law enforcement has been asked to serve as the last line of defense against terrorism (Murray, 2005). Where and how does this “staple” fit into the organization without depleting personnel resources and increasing already threatened budgets? Non-major law enforcement agencies across the nation are experiencing unprecedented budget cuts. According to a popular law enforcement police blog site entitled, *Policeone*, more than half the agencies questioned have been affected by funding cuts in recent months.
Regardless of the location or size of a community, they are not insulated from being the target of the next terrorist attack. Since law enforcement is considered the first line of defense of the nation, non-major law enforcement executives are challenged with the ability to keep their communities safe from terrorism without the funding sources to increase personnel or initiate new programs.

B. HOMELAND SECURITY—AVOIDING THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM

Top law enforcement executives across the nation are concerned more than ever on how they continue to provide basic police services within their community while facing decreasing budgets and reduction of employees (Carroll, 2011). The community places expectations on executives that they will ensure that basic police services are met while addressing any peripheral issues that place the safety of the community in jeopardy. Furthermore, the expectations require executives to communicate effectively on what their organization is doing to make the community safer.

Executives attending community speaking events, such as town hall meetings, neighborhood watch group meetings, and community civic meetings, find that the words “homeland security” are often followed by the citizen question, “What is the police department doing?” Failure to implement homeland security strategies can make this topic the “elephant” in the room that law enforcement executives will try to avoid rather than tackle head on. Advising the community that the police department is not capable of implementing homeland security strategies is a risky stance for any executive.

C. LOOKING IN THE MIRROR—ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ISSUES: THE FIRST STEP IN AVOIDING THE ELEPHANT

To confront problems facing organizations properly, a needs assessment to uncover the organizations underlying issues and concerns should be developed. As an example, an assessment was conducted within the Independence Missouri Police Department due to the increase in calls for service. The range of functions added to police duties in recent years and a decreasing budget forced the organization to conduct a realistic assessment of police services provided to the community. The organization faced
the reality that staff resources of the organization are stretched beyond the ability to cope with the communities growing demands. The goal of this assessment was to discover alternate methods of policing in contrast to the financial and personnel constraints being placed upon it. Following the assessment, the Independence Missouri Police Department command staff concluded the following.

- Decisions to be made regarding the reduction or elimination of provided police services to increase officers’ available (non-committed) time to problem solve within the community. *Currently, the average committed time for officers is 66.7 percent. Committed time entails answering calls for service and report writing only; it does not include proactive policing, administrative tasks or other tasks, such as training, which leaves very little, if any time, for the officer to problem solve within the community. Furthermore, the inability to problem solve within the community reduces the agency’s ability to build trust and collaboration.*

- Address disorder and nuisance violations using target-oriented policing to improve the quality of life for residents and to increase the communities trust in an effort to increase the reporting of crime, disorder and suspicious activity. *Efforts to address disorder and nuisance violations are typically only addressed as a reactive response when officers discover violations during a call for service. Seaming the communication gap with the public and increasing community collaboration will allow police officers to take a proactive stance and increase community collaboration efforts.*

- Limited staff and resources must be strategically deployed so that officers address emergency calls for service within a reasonable time and the reduction of crime and disorder occurs. *The primary purpose of intelligence-led policing is timely, accurate information. Leveraging crime statistics and collecting intelligence obtained via police officers are areas that the Independence Missouri Police Department is doing well with the implementation of CORE. Intelligence obtained through daily contacts with citizens and business owners is an area that the Independence Missouri Police Department has yet to leverage.*

- Leveraging the community to strengthen the city’s homeland security efforts

D. ANALYSIS OF RAND REPORT: MAJOR CITY HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAMS—DO STRATEGIES EXIST THAT FILL THE CURRENT GAP?

RAND completed an analysis of Major City Police Departments in 2010 entitled, *Long-Term Effects of Law Enforcement’s Post-9/11 Focus on Counterterrorism and*
Homeland Security. This study contributes to the homeland security research field by providing an analysis of the long-term impacts terrorism places on law enforcement agencies that practice HS and counterterrorism (CT) strategies. The important delineation between this report and the purpose of this thesis is that the RAND study is based on five large city law enforcement agencies that receive funding to support homeland security strategies within their respected communities. Drawing from this study, an analysis of the RAND study reveals indicators and factors that support homeland strategies and practices for non-major law enforcement agencies that result in little or no cost and without adding personnel to support the strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2010 Rand Report Summary of Initiatives</th>
<th>Outcome Resulting from Initiative</th>
<th>Requires Additional Cost</th>
<th>Requires Additional Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fusion Center</td>
<td>Improved Communications/Defined Responsibilities Across Disciplines</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fusion Center</td>
<td>Start-up New Fusion Center</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fusion Center</td>
<td>Increased Collaboration Across Sectors</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fusion Center</td>
<td>Designated Officer to Serve as Liaison with other Intelligence Sources</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMS</td>
<td>Standardized Language During Incident Response</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMS Training Requirements</td>
<td>Train all employee on Federal NIMS suggested Requirements</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Term Organizational Focus HS/CT</td>
<td>Technology Implementation to Share Info and Intelligence</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Term Organizational Focus HS/CT</td>
<td>Overall Cultural or Paradigm Shift</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship Building with Local Community</td>
<td>Improved Outreach and Relationship Building</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Analysis of 2010 RAND Study

The analysis of the RAND study revealed the following homeland security strategies (Figure 3) that can be implemented by non-major law enforcement agencies without increasing budgets or adding additional personnel resources.
Albeit the term “leadership” is not directly listed within the RAND study, failing to include this component will neglect the need to ensure that the law enforcement community develops and sustains current and future homeland security leaders. The International Association of Chiefs of Police argues that the importance of local police leadership prior to, during, and after a terrorism event is “urgently” needed (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2001). On June 5, 2008, Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff charged Judge William Webster with the task to chair an advisory committee to prepare a summary report on the top 10 challenges facing the nation’s homeland security. On September 11, 2008, the Homeland Security Advisory Council released the resulting report entitled, *Top Ten Challenges Facing the Next Secretary of Homeland Security*. Within this report, leadership and the need for the nation to prepare a “cadre” of homeland security leaders for the future of the nation’s security made the top 10 lists (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008).
The purpose of this summary is to provide a framework for this thesis on how the non-major law enforcement executive can implement SAR, Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) personnel, increased community collaboration, and develop a leadership program with little or no cost to the agency and without increasing manpower.

E. SAR REPORTING: A NON-MAJOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

Getting line officers to recognize and report potential terrorism-related activity is important. Having citizens do so is important as well. (Wagers & Bryan, 2011, p. 20)

What is the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) and why was this program developed? According to a 2009 report published by the Congressional Research Service, the federal government developed NSI in response to the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing Strategy mandating the federal government develop a “...nationwide capacity for a standardized, integrated approach to gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing information about suspicious activity that is potentially terrorism-related while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of Americans” (Randol, 2009, p. 7). An article published by The Police Chief in 2011 states a SAR report is, “is a report used to document any reported or observed activity, or any criminal act or attempted criminal act, which an officer believes may reveal a nexus to foreign or domestic terrorism...The SAR process focuses on what law enforcement agencies have been doing for years—gathering information regarding behaviors and incidents associated with crime and establishing a process whereby information can be shared to detect and prevent criminal activity, including that associated with domestic and international terrorism” (Colwell & Kelly, 2011).

Non-major law enforcement agencies can enhance homeland security efforts through the adoption and implementation of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative. The adoption of the SAR will provides a framework for the department in developing policy and procedures in the use of SAR reporting. Coordinating information with fusion centers will strengthen vertical and horizontal
homeland security intelligence sharing. For example, The Los Angeles Police Department, under the authority of Chief William J. Bratton, implemented the SAR reporting process in March 2008 (ACLU of Washington, n.d.).

In 2008, two days before Christmas, a decorated military veteran named Steven Jordal was arrested outside of a crowded shopping mall in Oklahoma while in possession of a bomb and a handgun. The arresting officer documented information from the incident and forwarded to his commanding officers. This intelligence sharing resulted in the arrest of Steven Jordal for multiple counts of possession of bomb-making material. During the investigation, it was determined that Jordal was making IED devices and selling them to gang members. One month prior to the officer’s actions, he attended shift-level training on the importance of documenting suspicious activity during report writing and then alerting supervisors of the incident for intelligence screening purposes (Cid, 2009). This powerful example demonstrates how acts of terrorism can be revealed when proper documentation and sharing of this information can prevent acts of terrorism.

Organizational implementation of NSI will require five processes to occur: information acquisition, organizational processing, integration and consolidation, data retrieval and distribution, and feedback (Colwell & Kelly, 2011). The three stories above demonstrate how the SAR impacts day-to-day police business. Since specific strategies are in place, SAR reporting proves to be effective and efficient in securing a community from possible terroristic threats.

SAR was developed recognizing that the general operation of police departments vary across the nation. The NSI program proclaims that SAR can be implemented by any agency without adding personnel regardless of its size. The reporting method allows for agencies to develop policies and procedures allowing for full implementation by all levels of the law enforcement community (tribal, local, state, and federal), and the initiative was developed with the protection, privacy, and civil liberties of all Americans as a priority. According to the United States Bureau of Justice Assistance, “All agencies, regardless of size or jurisdiction, have a role in the nationwide SAR process” (United States Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2008, p. 3). Non-major law enforcement agencies do have a role in the SAR reporting and it can provide an avenue to increase communications and
collaboration with the community. In addition, SAR reporting establishes a standardized form of reporting suspicious activity internally to reduce opportunities of information being lost or information not followed up on.

F. CASE STUDY EXAMPLE: IMPLEMENTING SAR REPORTING WITHIN THE INDEPENDENCE MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT

The Independence Missouri Police Department employs two civilian crime analysts who work Monday–Friday 0730 to 1600 hours. The crime analysts report to the Deputy Chief of Field Operations who oversees all field operation divisions of the police department (Uniform Patrol, Special Operations, and Investigations). Approximately two years ago, the police department implemented an intelligence-led policing strategy called CORE (Crime Overview Response and Evaluation). The two crime analysts spend a majority of their time collecting, analyzing, and disseminating crime reports for department CORE meetings that occur weekly. This activity limits the crime analyst’s ability to dedicate time and effort towards the collection, processing, analyzing, and dissemination of homeland security intelligence within the organization and with other local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Recognizing that the crime analysts cannot fulfill the homeland security intelligence needs of the department, a strategy that uses existing personnel within the organization is needed to strengthen the homeland security intelligence cycle.

The current manpower allocation for the Independence Missouri Police Department is operating at its maximum capacity due to increasing crime rates, limited budget allocation, and high numbers of calls for service. The organization is unable to form a part-time or full-time unit of civilian or commissioned employees to specifically deal with homeland security intelligence issues. Furthermore, the Independence Missouri Police Department lacks formal policies or procedures in reporting homeland security intelligence for commissioned or non-commissioned employees. Recently, this researcher asked various employees and supervisors during regular briefings if they knew what to do if they suspect that someone is involved or connected to a terrorist organization. Many Independence Missouri Police Department employees’ comments varied and seldom did
the response include the utilization of the Kansas City Regional Terrorism Early Warning (KCTEW) fusion center. During these discussions, employees were asked if they are aware of Kansas City Terrorism Early Warning’s function. The majority of employees responded that they did not know. The most common answer received from employees is that a departmental Field Interview Form (FIF) is completed and sent to the department’s crime analysts for processing. Several problems exist with this answer. First, the current FIF form is based on street-level crime information; the current form lacks relevant information to note activity that may be linked to terrorism. Secondly, no policies or procedures within the Independence Missouri Police Department exist to ensure this information is properly handled. Finally, no policy(s) exists within the Independence Missouri Police Department that mandates how or when information requires further dissemination outside of the organization.

1. **Needs Assessment**

   Within this strategy development, three areas must be evaluated before a strategy is considered acceptable. First, due to insufficient funding, the strategy or resulting procedure(s) must work using existing personnel resources of the organization. Initially, using existing resources will require personnel and money; however, training specific leaders as “train the trainers” will provide on-going instruction to employees and will minimize on-going training costs for the organization. Once leaders are provided the knowledge and framework of the program, they could resume their current positions within the department. Second, the strategy should include clear, concise procedures for department-wide implementation to strengthen intelligence sharing within the organization and outside law enforcement entities. Finally, the strategy or resulting procedure(s) does not violate citizen privacy acts, municipal, state, and federal laws. Since specific guidelines are adopted and then followed, citizens basic rights are maintained by the constitution and the integrity of each organization that implements policy.
2. **Options Available to Address the Homeland Security Intelligence Cycle**

   a. **Option 1**

   The Independence Missouri Police Department operates without making adaptations to current procedures. No strategy has been developed to strengthen the homeland security intelligence cycle. Opting to remain status quo can result in failure of the organization to “connect the dots,” which allows potential acts of terrorism to go undetected that could result in a catastrophic event. The current situation, operating with little to no partnership with homeland security intelligence, hinders the responsibility the department has with the community and nation as being the nation’s first line of defense.

   b. **Option 2**

   Some local law enforcement agencies utilize law enforcement network groups to share information using secured websites. Networks, such as the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), the FBI’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISSnet), can be effective tools for sharing information; however, relying on networks alone fails to provide a departmental homeland security strategy for the Independence Missouri Police Department. The feasibility in providing members of the organization access to these networks will be difficult, if not impossible. Ensuring all of the information is entered correctly into all of the above databases will create the need for more personnel, which directly makes for budget concerns. This option feels overwhelming and inefficient. Key organization members should continue to be encouraged to use this form of networking. However, this option alone will not fully address the organization’s current need.

   c. **Option 3**

   Adoption and implementation of the NSI, through the coordination and assistance of the KCTEW center, provides departments with an avenue to document possible concerns properly. The adoption of the SAR will provide a framework for the
department to develop policies and procedures in homeland security strategies for the Independence Missouri Police Department. Coordinating information with the KCTEW center will strengthen vertical and horizontal homeland security intelligence sharing, which allows the organization to function at a higher level. This option will require additional work prior to the adoption of SAR in the department. The implementation process requires staffed meetings to discuss existing and future policy processes, which will encourage development, training, and outreach.

NSI was developed recognizing that the operations of police departments vary across the nation. NSI reveals that SAR can be implemented by any agency without adding personnel regardless of its size. The SAR program allows for agencies to develop through policies and procedures allowing for full implementation by all levels of the law enforcement community (tribal, local, state, and federal). The initiative was developed with the protection, privacy, and civil liberties of all Americans as a priority. According to the United States Bureau of Justice Assistance, SAR is obtainable and useful to all agencies regardless of size (United States Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2008).

G. CONCLUSION SAR REPORTING FOR THE INDEPENDENCE MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT

To pursue the organization’s commitment to homeland security, the organization must adopt a strategy to implement the NSI initiative. Option #3 provides the framework necessary to strengthen an organization’s intelligence cycle, while meeting the needs of the organization without the need to hire additional personnel. To assist law enforcement agencies in the adoption and implementation of SAR, the United States Bureau of Justice Assistance developed a guide entitled, Suspicious Activity Reporting Process Implementation Checklist (United States Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2008). This checklist will ensure uniformity within the department and encourage proper documentation, which directly impacts communication and performance.

The Independence Missouri Police Department should consider implementation of SAR using the following courses of action suggested by this checklist.
• Closely collaborate with partners, such as fusion centers, homeland security officials, joint terrorism task forces, and the *eGuardian* program.

• Brief command staff/senior management on the SAR implementation process, to include policy development, privacy and civil liberties protections, technology, training, and community outreach.

• Assign primary responsibility for implementing the SAR process to a command-level position.

• Provide training to command staff/senior management on the implementation of the SAR process using agency training or programs already developed (United States Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2008)

SAR reporting training will be the same for all police department employees. However, how the SAR reporting process is implemented within the agency can vary. The SAR reporting program provides non-major law enforcement agencies with the opportunity to strengthen internal intelligence processes and information sharing within the agency. Incorporating the SAR process with field reporting can provide non-major law enforcement agencies the ability to streamline the organization’s reporting process.
IV. CASE STUDY—A COMPARISON MODEL OF THE UK INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING

The future successes of intelligence-led policing efforts depend largely on the agency's ability to collaborate with the citizens and businesses in a meaningful way (Carroll, 2011). The purpose of this section is to outline the policing strategies employed by the United Kingdom (UK) and discuss how a modified understanding of the UK policing strategies could strengthen the American law enforcement intelligence-led policing model through the collaboration of the community and private sector. This comparison model of the UK provides a foundation for the non-major police agencies to engage successful leadership strategies, as well as a framework for citizens and businesses to collaborate in a specific initiative. The implementation of SAR requires active policing within the community and bolstering community awareness. This impact may provide intelligence about future terrorist threats and reporting the information to the correct agencies to pursue action. This level of community support is necessary to ensure safety for all citizens.

The police and the citizens share ownership of the community problems (Scott & Goldstein, 2005). Although the police can solely address some crime and disorder, other problems require community-led efforts (Scott & Goldstein, 2005). Police serve as the enforcement element of this effort. The Independence Missouri Police Department believes the quality of life within each neighborhood results from a vested interest from both the police and the community. The community must work with the district officer who is familiar with that area; however, the police department is challenged with how to increase the one-on-one contact with the community.

Strategies utilized in the United Kingdom may provide the seam needed to strengthen the organization’s information-sharing and collaboration capabilities with the community; further advancing the organization’s intelligence-led policing process to reduce crime and disorder with minimal or low cost and without adding personnel resources. These attributes are important for non-major law enforcement agencies looking for low cost strategies to implement within their communities that strengthen the
community’s ability to prevent acts of terrorism. The United Kingdom found a correlation between perception of crime by the public and reported crime. The percentage of people who thought the local police did a good to excellent job increased year to year. Over a six-year period, confidence from the general public had for the police increased by six points, and in 2008–2009, statistics stood at 53% (Myhill & Quinton, 2010). Public confidence continued in an upward trend, while perception of crime continued to decrease (Myhill & Quinton, 2010).

Public confidence is directly linked to personal policing and relationship building within the community. This kind of policing does not add dollar signs to a budget, nor does it require additional officers. Non-major agencies could easily implement personal contact time with local citizens through many different community service events, through school involvement, and even the way calls are accepted and later followed up on. Building a relationship with the community takes time and a lot of dedication. It is proven that perception can affect crime within the community. During 2010, UK research indicated that positive public perception of the police did have a correlation in the reduction of crimes in the communities studied (Myhill & Quinton, 2010).

A. INDEPENDENCE MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING SOLUTIONS/STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION: CORE AND COPS

The City of Independence, Missouri is located along the eastern edge of the Kansas City Metropolitan area with a population of 116,830 as reported in the 2010 census. It is the fourth largest city in the state of Missouri. The Independence, Missouri Police Department serves the community with a staff of 203 sworn officers and 97 civilians. The total police to population ratio is 1.74 compared to the national average of 2.3 (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009).

According to the department’s crime analyst, during 2008 and 2009, Part 1, property crimes experienced a decrease in crime due to the department’s CORE Initiatives 2008–2009 and 2008–2008. (Table 2)
Table 2. Decrease in Robbery Armed. (From: Dachenhausen, 2009)

The Independence Missouri Police Department also experienced a decrease in non-residential burglaries in the first, second, and third quarter during CORE initiatives 2009–2006 and 2009–2004 as reported by a department crime analyst. (Table 3)

Table 3. Decrease in Burglary Non-Residence. (From: Dachenhausen, 2009)

Prior to the implementation of CORE in 2008, the city experienced a significant increase in violent crime, property crime and disorder/disturbances. (Table 4)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Classification</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>% Diff. ’08-’10</th>
<th>% Diff. ’09-’10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Homicide</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>167%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negligent Manslaughter</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcible Rape</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-31%</td>
<td>-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted Rape</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>133%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>-25%</td>
<td>-26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>-48%</td>
<td>-41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotals Violent Part 1 Crimes</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>-41%</td>
<td>-35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary / Breaking and Entering</td>
<td>1236</td>
<td>1304</td>
<td>1413</td>
<td>1328</td>
<td>1246</td>
<td>-12%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny/Theft</td>
<td>5538</td>
<td>5547</td>
<td>5904</td>
<td>5135</td>
<td>5242</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>1082</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-19%</td>
<td>-24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal Property Part 1 Crimes</td>
<td>7648</td>
<td>7968</td>
<td>8123</td>
<td>7195</td>
<td>7245</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Part 1 Crimes</td>
<td>8461</td>
<td>8805</td>
<td>8948</td>
<td>7944</td>
<td>7729</td>
<td>-14%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Independence Missouri Crime Statistics 2006–2010

The above charts provide a breakdown of crime and disorder in the City of Independence, Missouri. After implementation of CORE/COPS, there is visible reduction in various crimes across the board, noting the program’s success.

B. CORE/COPS

Subsequent to the Independence Missouri’s Police Chief’s appointment, Chief Dailey implemented an intelligence-led policing strategy called Crime Overview Response and Evaluation (CORE). Following the implementation of CORE, a second intelligence-led policing concept termed Community Oriented Problem Solving (COPS) was integrated into the CORE process. Both CORE and COPS are strategies employed by the Independence Missouri Police Department that involve collaboration with residents, businesses, and other government organizations to solve systemic issues that cause crime and disorder. Solutions to crime and disorder issues are generally not found within the criminal justice system, but instead found within the community (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010).
Command staff and police department employees work hand-in-hand with the community. Many issues and concerns are addressed “on the scene” and tackled with a direct plan in mind to ensure officer safety, as well as citizen rights. CORE/COPS provide a framework for citizens to partner with police officials with positive, specific procedures. Looking at CORE and COPS, and investigating its conception, may provide an excellent insight to the implementing a homeland security program within the Independence Missouri Police Department.

In 2005, the Police Executive Research Forum released *Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement*. This report states, “Local law enforcement should remain committed to using a problem-solving approach to both crime and terrorism that builds on successful partnerships with citizens” (Davies, Plotkin, Filler, Flynn, Forseman, Litzinger, McCarthy & Wiseman, 2005, p. 78).

The key elements of the Independence Missouri Police Department CORE process are the following.

- Timely and accurate information obtained from officers, investigators, and citizens for inspection by the crime analysis unit, and distributed in a timely fashion
- Effective and creative tactics and strategies developed by not only commanders and supervisors, but line officers close to the problem at hand
- Rapid deployment of available resources inside and outside the department
- Constant follow-up and evaluation by command staff members to determine if tactics are effective; adjustment may be required to deliver results

COPS is a philosophy of the police working together with the community to solve crime and disorder issues, in which ownership of the problem is not exclusively assigned to the police. The COPS process recognizes that a cooperative effort between citizens, businesses, service agencies, and the police is often required to solve these problems. Examples of crime and disorder in the community include a new business opening in the neighborhood, which in turn, attracts young people who drive recklessly to get there. A homeowner moves and converts the house into rental property, and then leases it to individuals who have loud parties every weekend. A nearby city park attracts juveniles
who vandalize the area with graffiti. Disorder issues plague many communities and are a
nuisance to citizens, businesses, and the police. Disorder issues waste public resources
and reflect poorly upon the community as a whole. Often the first reaction is to report this
issue to the police and expect the problem to be solved permanently by responding
officers. In reality, the situation is temporarily resolved using either an arrest or the
issuance of a warning. Often the problem resurfaces and the problem continues in the
future. Failing to problem solve issues and providing closure to such issues creates many
problems for the police department and community alike. Some of these issues include
community distrust that the police will not assist them on issues of concern, which
reduces the ability to form a strong community collaboration and expending resources
and time of officers to deal with the ongoing problems rather than focusing on homeland
security strategies within the community.

Non-major law enforcement agencies must focus on policing strategies that will
lessen the workload of officers to allow them additional time to focus on homeland
security strategies and practices. To strengthen this strategy, agencies should focus on
building strong collaboration with the community to allow the community to serve as the
eyes and ears for the police department.

Since the implementation of CORE within the Independence Missouri Police
Department, the organization continues to experience positive results in reducing crime
and disorder. For example, in 2010, the city experienced an increase in property crimes in
a district located on the northeast section of the community. On April 24, 2010, the
department identified the area as a “core initiative” (also referred to as a hot spot). The
information is disseminated to department members via electronic crime/intelligence
bulletins, weekly meetings between assigned officers, supervisors, and division
commanders to discuss policing strategies to reduce crime and disorder within the hot-
spot area. After policing strategies are agreed upon, officers from the uniform,
investigative, traffic safety, and tactical units implement the strategies. The assigned
supervisors in each division constantly monitor the CORE initiative and tactics are
discussed and/or changed based on the intelligence gathered. The CORE Initiative,
entitled 10-04, began on April 24, 2010 and a department crime analyst noted a decrease
in crime during the May 12, 2010 reporting period. CORE and COPS are examples of collaborative initiatives among police officials and the citizens. Like all newly implemented programs, a foundation of trust must be laid. Once the community believes in a program and the people trying to implement it, then positive results are just a matter of time (See Hawthorne statistic table in Appendix A).

Major and non-major police departments face ongoing concerns on a daily basis. Non-major police departments must constantly be adapting to decreasing budgets and personnel with a possible increase of community concerns, such as terrorism threats. Major police departments are more likely to receive federal assistance due to size and the number of citizens affected by police decisions on a daily basis. Non-major agencies must continue to look within their department to overcome such issues without increasing budget and personnel.

After implementing the department’s crime reduction efforts in the targeted area, a decrease in property crimes occurred. This CORE initiative started on April 24 and was closed mid-June. Once a CORE initiative is activated, an activity log is started and placed within a central computer location to which all police department employees have access. The purpose of the CORE activity log is to share any information that the employee believes is pertinent to the collaborative crime reduction strategy. CORE activity logs typically include information, such as enforcement activity, people of interest, investigative leads, or details of crimes reported in the target area. Appendix B provides a framework on how these efforts are conducted and communicated to various department members during this specific CORE initiative. The CORE process has built a stronger communication network both internally and within the community. Reducing crime and disorder within the community has done the same. This process forms relationships with the police officers and the community, and therefore, increases the communities’ willingness to report crime and disorder. Unsolicited comments from officers indicate an increased feeling of “ownership” exists to resolving problems with the community. This communications foundation is important in building community collaboration and trust for the success of future homeland security programs.
Appendix C depicts a summary of the total hours of time committed within the CORE initiative area by the various uniform patrol units and various specialized units. A total of 116 hours, 25 minutes and 33 seconds is documented within the department’s Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system from the period of April 25, 2010 through May 16, 2010. The CORE strategy facilitated a coordinated effort from the various divisions of the department to target the specific geographic area, provided a mechanism to communicate law enforcement (LE) efforts, and ultimately, reduced crime in the targeted area.

Representatives from the various divisions within the organization meet weekly during CORE operation meetings to review enforcement strategies and current crime statistical information. Prior to the implementation of CORE, communication and crime reduction strategies lacked collaborative communication and effort between the various units within the organization. In measuring the department’s CORE success, a variety of indicators, or performance measures, are reviewed and discussed during bi-weekly command staff CORE meetings. The first indicator is evaluating crime rates before, during, and after CORE initiatives to determine what, if any, policing strategies were effective. The primary goal of this evaluation is to determine, if possible, the correlation between the strategy and an increase or decrease of crime within the targeted area. The second indicator is public response to the targeted policing strategies. The internal and external communication process before, during, and after the CORE initiative is reviewed to ensure the communication process with employees and the public are effective to maximize current and future collaboration efforts.

Appendix D consists of a departmental memorandum authored by the patrol division’s major at the conclusion of the organization’s efforts to reduce crime and disorder in the targeted geographic area. The previous information proves that through a collaborative platform, precise communication and community partnership, the Independence Missouri Police Department can adopt a new program with a high probability of success. The Independence Missouri Police Department, like other non-
major agencies, not only face day-to-day crime and disorder concerns, but now acts of terrorism and fear associated with such threats, weave into U.S. society and plague departments with increased demand and workload with limited resources.

C. ANALYSIS: UK: NEIGHBORHOOD POLICING MODEL AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION

During a review of successful strategies employed by other nations, this researcher discovered a concept engaged by the United Kingdom termed Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs) and Police Community Support Officers (PSCOs). The integration of this policing model may prove beneficial to non-major law enforcement agencies. Specifically, this comparative policy strategy analysis focuses on which strategies the United Kingdom employs to build relationships with the community in the reduction of crime/disorder and how this strategy can strengthen the U.S. policing model.

According to a UK report entitled, Safe and Confident Neighbourhoods Strategy: Next Steps in Neighbourhood Policing, the neighbourhood [sic] policing model is helping the United Kingdom engage crime issues in its communities. The report states, “Through positive engagement, neighbourhood [sic] policing teams can encourage people to come forward with information to help keep their own neighbourhood [sic] safe-community intelligence that is critical in combating, for instance, organized crime or terrorism” (Home Office, 2010, p. 12). According to the United Kingdom, this form of community policing enables accessibility to the people and the platform that engages the community to work on local crime and disorder (Bullock, 2010). Furthermore, the PSCOs should be accountable to the local people so that feedback provides answers to the police on its effectiveness (Bullock, 2010).

Implementing the UK community-policing model into the CORE and COPS strategies affords opportunities to build a relationship with officers and the community. Building relationships will increase trust of the community to discuss crime and disorder issues occurring within the neighborhoods. The UK PSCO team concept increases positive officer/citizen contact in which the community desires, strengthen community and agency collaboration efforts and provide opportunities for citizens to report...
suspicious activity with a nexus to terrorist activity. As noted in the United Kingdom, this model of policing also serves as a measuring stick to determine if the tactics and strategies are effective (Savage, 2007).

According to the July 2010 UK government document, *Strategy Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting Police and the People*, the United Kingdom vows to strengthen the police and community relationship by transferring power back to people (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2010). The strategy calls for bringing the people and the police together in a unified effort to fight crime and anti-social behavior (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2010). Furthermore, the UK strategy plan calls for regular beat [sic] meetings held by the police for the public with the goal to increase police accountability and citizen’s access to the police, and improve the police’s transparency (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2010).

Citizen involvement in the CORE and COPS process will add yet another dimension in the intelligence led policing with the potential to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the allocation of manpower and target-oriented policing strategies.

Police agencies failing to facilitate community input/opinion when making policing strategy decisions lack the avenue for immediate feedback from the citizens regarding issues they want addressed in their neighborhoods. Police departments that build trust and cooperation of the community experience significant reductions in crime rates (Byxbe & Carlan, 2001).

A review of the July 2010, *Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting Police and People*, reveals a radical reform by the government to shift the policing power from a bureaucratic accountability system to a democratic accountability system; giving power back to the people to oversee and direct police services (Home Office, 2010). This document, produced by the UK government's Home Office, provides strategy implications that non-major law enforcement agencies can incorporate to strengthen community-oriented policing concepts of law enforcement agencies.
Strategy goals include increasing opportunities for the public to share information with uniformed police officers working the streets on a daily basis. In this report, Home Secretary Theresa May states, “Our plans will make the police more accountable, accessible and transparent to the public and therefore make our communities safer. Regular beat meetings will allow people to challenge the police’s performance and accessible ‘street level’ crime data will shine a light on local crime trends and concerns” (Home Office, 2010, p. 3).

The foundation of success for the United Kingdom and the Independence Missouri Police Department is a direct partnership of police officials working with the community and providing a collaborative environment to ensure safety and rights of all citizens. Consistent data collection and review of this data will provide direction for the department so that decisions can be made.

The UK strategy of placing PCSOs within the community bridges the current communication gap by directly connecting citizens with front line police officers. Furthermore, implementing the UK policing model provides law enforcement executives with the opportunity to incorporate PCSOs as the department’s TLO. A department appointed TLO’s responsibilities include working with line staff identify terrorism related situations and share intelligence related to terrorism, serve as the point-of-contact within the agency for questions and information regarding terrorism, and terrorism related leads and tips, and building a working relationship with the local fusion center to help facilitate information/intelligence to and from field personnel. Training for TLO officers is typically provided free of charge through local fusion centers or coordinated by professional organizations, such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Non-major agencies are not limited on how many TLO officers to deploy within the department; each agency can decide individually on the number of TLO officers it will need for successful implementation.

When organizations are limited in personnel resources, the department can leverage the PCSOs trust with the community so that timely information is received on possible terrorist activity. The PCSOs can provide education and training to the citizens regarding homeland security prevention and reporting suspicious activity observed within
their community, and thereby, increase the reporting of crime, and the intervention and identification of potential terrorists. A recent story cited in the February 2011 *The Police Chief* magazine provides evidence of leveraging the community’s assistance:

> Due to outreach to storage facility employees by a fusion center, an employee noticed something unusual while working at a self-storage facility and contacted the police. The police ran checks and found that the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force had an active investigation and the individuals associated with the storage unit were currently under surveillance. Two weeks after reporting the activity, four men were arrested for plotting to detonate explosives near a synagogue and conspiring to shoot down with stinger missiles military planes located at a National Guard Base. (Keyer & Miller, 2011, p. 40)

The United Kingdom and American community policing models are similar in that they both rely on community involvement to reduce crime and disorder. The UK neighbourhood strategy involves placing officers within their different communities to enable their police officers to have a better understanding of the various cultures that comprise their communities (Home Office, 2010). This cultural awareness will provide officers with a better understanding of the citizens whom they serve while providing insight on how to communicate effectively, educate and increase problem-solving efforts. Since officers are dealing with the people within their own community, a program such as the one adopted in the United Kingdom could be successful no matter where it is implemented. It directly correlates with the officer’s ability to establish trust within the community. This trust will directly impact a program’s acceptance within the neighborhood, and allow for increased information exchange between the police and the community.

In the strategy report entitled, *Safe and Confident Neighbourhoods Strategy: Next Steps in Neighbourhood Policing*, several UK strategies can be implemented to engage citizen and strengthen collaboration with the police agency. The following strategies, taken from Chapter III of the *Safe and Confident Neighbourhoods Strategy*, entitled “Engaging Communities” [sic], provide consideration by U.S. law enforcement agencies (Home Office, 2010, pp. 38–40).
3. 15 The public should be asked what issues matter to them most so services can be provided which are more responsive to local people and therefore satisfactory and efficient.

3. 18 The public should also be able to influence how services are delivered “In England and Wales there are now ‘Councillor [sic] Calls for Action’ and Overview and Scrutiny Committees, which are made up of councillors [sic] and are responsible for scrutinising [sic] the council’s executive and other local public service providers on behalf of the public. In England, the Government is enabling members of the public and community groups to be co-opted on onto Overview and Scrutiny Committees which deal with crime and disorder issues.

3. 22 To be confident and able to play a full role in their own neighbourhood’s [sic] safety “As well as influencing and challenging how services are delivered, this could be giving up some of their time to play a role keeping their neighbourhood safe and confident or be as simple as reporting crime and ASB (Anti-Social Behavior) when they see it and acting responsibly.”

The foundation of the UK neighbourhood [sic] policing strategies are based on, “A clear agreement at a neighbourhood [sic] level between the public and services; a signed agreement of both interest groups” (Home Office, 2010, p. 41). The Safe and Confident Neighbourhoods Strategy pledges the benefits of this approach to policing is that it strengthens the country’s counterterrorism strategy, also known as “PREVENT,” in that this relationship building allows for a trusted exchange of information between the citizen and the police and encourages the public and partners to engage acts of violent extremism (Home Office, 2010). Similar to what is being experienced with the CORE process within the Independence Missouri Police Department, the UK model of policing is founded on building trust and communication with the community. Unreported incidents of crime, disorder, and suspicious activity will negatively impact law enforcement agencies’ ability to detect and deter potential acts of terrorism.

Six years following the implementation of neighbourhood [sic] teams in the United Kingdom, the country has experienced a 92% public approval rating (Home Office, 2010). The Safe and Confident Neighbourhood Strategy posits a variety of stratagems to measure the success of the PCSOs within the communities. Strategy 1.25 (Figure 4) states that the public should expect the following from their PCSO program.
Non-major police agencies that implement the PCSO strategy within their respected jurisdictions should consider a similar strategy to ensure that the PCSO program is meeting expectations of the organization and the community alike. An independent review and analysis of the UK neighbourhood policing strategy was conducted by Karen Bullock in January, 2010. Bullock assessed the UK’s neighbourhood strategy pledge in specific areas of the program’s objectives. Subsequently, Bullock’s assessment provides an accountability framework for non-major agencies to adopt within their own PCSO program. (Figure 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provide details of the neighbourhood policing team personnel, where they are based, how to contact them and how to work with them</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrange regular public meetings to agree priorities, at least once a month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide monthly updates on progress in dealing with the priorities and on local crime and policing issues. This should be provided at neighbourhood meetings, on the web and via a detailed newsletter delivered quarterly to each household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide web-based maps along with data about crime in an area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respond to every message directed to the neighbourhood policing team within 24 hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. Accountability Framework for Non-Major Agencies to Adopt. (From: Bullock, 2010)
This strong community and police department alliance sends a strong message to criminals and terrorists; if they choose to engage in unlawful activity, they will be identified and prosecuted for their actions. Communicating stories with the press on how the community/police partnership positively impacts crime and disorder within the community will increase the perception of a safe and resilient community for the citizens and neighboring cities alike (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). Sharing success stories on how the community/police relationship reduces crime and disorder within the community provides citizens with the confidence that they can work with the police to resolve issues while reducing the fear of retaliation from offenders. Building trust and communication between the community and the police increases the police department’s ability to strengthen collaboration efforts desired in building a strong homeland security strategy with U.S. communities.

D. UK STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

Formal agreements signed by the law enforcement agency and the community may be a consideration to strengthen community collaboration. One advantage of a formal agreement with the community is that this process ensures two-way communication between the community and the LE agency. Providing two distinct attributes; first, this form of agreement can further leverage the community to impact crime and disorder, and second, this process will fill the desire of the community by providing interaction with police officers (Bullock, 2010).

When considering the implementation of UK strategies, the organization must consider three primary issues. First, if the organization chooses to implement signing agreements with the community, how will the organization market the product to encourage citizen and business owners to participate? It is imperative that the organization consider a marketing strategy to increase the number of businesses and citizens that participate. Secondly, the police department must consider how the organization responds to the program when the personnel resources of the police department are already stretched. If the organization chooses to implement signed
agreements with the community, a system providing timely feedback and response from
the organization will be critical. Finally, due to budget constraints, no additional
personnel must be required to perform additional strategies.

Although LE agencies continually make valiant efforts to bridge communications
with the community and reduce crime and disorder, the success of these applications
typically fail to address public desire for increased citizen contact with police officers.
For the future success of community-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing,
implementing select UK strategies will assist LE agencies in seaming the current gap
with the community, businesses and the police department.

The implementation of this strategy can start with the process of selecting a
community/police committee, using selected members of the organization and
community leaders, to determine the feasibility of full or partial implementation of the
selected UK strategies. This committee will be charged with developing organizational
policy and procedures, goals and a marketing strategy to engage the community into the
process. This committee’s responsibilities will include an in-depth organizational analysis
to determine if current resources within the organization can be tasked with the additional
responsibilities.

Forming this community/police committee will promote increased
communications and transparencies with the public. This committee concept provides
additional opportunities to problem solve the needs of the department and the
community. Publicizing information from these committee meetings on an ongoing basis
will strengthen vertical and horizontal communications while increasing transparency and
collaboration with the community. This committee shall establish policy and procedures
addressing formal agreements with the community to address crime and disorder,
establish guidelines for citizen to attend bi-weekly public meetings and establish
guidelines for conducting monthly public quadrant meetings. The goal of this committee
is to assess the viability of implementing successful UK policing strategies into the
organization’s intelligence led policing efforts.
Another helpful strategy would be to develop and distribute press releases advising the public that the police department will conduct monthly quadrant meetings. The monthly quadrant meetings information might be comprised of crime reporting summaries for that time period and could serve several purposes. First, these meetings would give current crime statistics to the citizens to allow them to remain informed of what is occurring in their community. Secondly, the quadrant meetings can provide team-building decisions to determine joint crime prevention strategies with the community to address identified crime trends and provide a platform to discuss homeland security programs with the community. This combination of strategies will increase citizen awareness and organizational transparency and are essential building blocks in implementing a new program within an organization focused upon citizen involvement to aid in keeping police aware of community concerns so manpower can be minimal yet effective.

Another helpful strategy would be to learn how to apply PCSO strategies within their assigned areas of responsibility and would enhance communication within the department and community. This strategy development could start with command staff members conducting a full analysis of how officers are deployed within the community to meet the identified goals developed collaboratively with valued stakeholders.
V. LOW COST TECHNOLOGY: FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO STRENGTHEN COMMUNITY COLLABORATION

A. BACKGROUND

In addition to the positive impact the UK model has proven to public communities, the Independence Missouri Police Department has witnessed and documented powerful results with the implementation of CORE and COPS. Technology has been able to marry the past with the present brilliantly. Technology provides a citizen everyday access to what is happening in the community and allows police officials to document and view properly a much larger scope of what types of crime and disorder are occurring within the community, which allows the police department to be more efficient and effective in keeping citizens safe.

Technology continues to change and provide faster and more detailed services. If non-major police departments adopt a program to increase homeland security, technology serves as a fundamental piece in this process. It is essential that specific procedures and policies be in place to enter data correctly, quickly, and efficiently so that surrounding agencies, as well as major agencies, could view the data and make accurate and timely responses. CrimeReports.com downloads crime statistic information directly from the CAD program to allow citizens to view current crime information from their personal computers. Citizens can also choose to receive email alerts advising them of crime activity near their homes or businesses. Figure 6 shows an example of what a citizen can view on the computer. This map depicts what crimes occurred in a selected area. Clicking on the various icons will provide specific information on what crime was committed, when it was reported and the related police report number taken.
This service meets the need of police department’s expectations in delivering timely crime statistics to enable citizens to act appropriately with the information. However, this form of social networking conflicts with the personal two-way interaction that the community voiced as a desire during town hall meetings.

During the early months of 2010, Independence Missouri Police Department command staff members attended town hall meetings across the community. The goal of the town hall meetings was to ask the community what expectations it has of police. It was the intent of police to present challenges that the police department faces on a day-to-day basis to the community.

During each of these town hall meetings, the citizens voiced a strong desire for increased personal contact with uniformed police officers. Although the police
department implemented new strategies and technology, such as Twitter and Facebook, to bridge the communication gap, it remains apparent that additional strategies must be explored to meet community expectations. Consideration must be given when asking the community for assistance and then failing to provide sufficient means. In many LE agencies across the nation, community interaction with police usually only occurs when a citizen or business calls the police department and requests an officer respond due to an issue of concern or simply by a chance meeting with a police officer patrolling in the community.

Due to the resource limitations of local police departments as addressed above, it is nearly impossible for officers of non-major departments to be in every neighborhood at all times. Solutions to crime and disorder issues are generally not found within the criminal justice system; it is the efforts of the community (Scott & Goldstein, 2005). The police department recognizes that the future successes of intelligence-led policing efforts depend largely on the agency's ability to collaborate with the citizens and businesses located within the community (Byxbe & Carlan, 2001).

In an effort to bridge this gap, the Independence Missouri Police Department implemented Web 2.0 technology as a means to address this need. During the town hall meetings, citizen comments revealed that the community desires additional means of two-way communication with the police. To determine what, if any, technology applications exist to strengthen community collaboration with little or no cost and without increasing personnel resources, the goal derived from this meeting entailed researching current Web 2.0 applications and to provide strategy recommendations to strengthen the organizations information sharing and collaboration capabilities with the community utilizing available Web 2.0 technologies.

To start this process, command staff members investigated improved methods to record crime statistics for the purpose of responding to and addressing crime and disorder problems within the community. Budget constraints placed on the police department demanded that any technology application considerations be limited to off the shelf availability and relatively inexpensive.
The command staff concluded that applying affordable technology within intelligence-led policing concepts are critical in accomplishing the Independence Missouri Police Department mission, to reduce crime and disorder using the processes of CORE and COPS with the assistance of available technology. Non-major police departments rely heavily upon officers to interact effectively within their community. Technology is yet another strategy to aid in successful police enforcement, but it will never replace human interaction. Technology, community involvement, and proactive police work provide a framework, which is reliant upon each other. The police and the citizens share ownership of the community problem (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010). Although some crime and disorder can be addressed solely by the police, other problems require community-led efforts (Goldstein & Susmilch, 1981). Police serve as the enforcement element of this effort. The Independence Missouri Police Department believes the quality of life within each neighborhood results from a vested interest from both the police and the community. The community must work with the district officer familiar with that area.

The Independence Missouri Police Department is now asking the citizens and businesses to help by becoming involved in their communities. With the limited resources available to the police department, it is impossible for officers to be in every neighborhood at all times. The citizens who live in these neighborhoods can gather information about crime and disorder issues and pass it along to responding officers. Recording license plate numbers, noting accurate vehicle or suspect descriptions, and taking photographs can be a tremendous help in the successful identification and prosecution of offenders. This collaborative effort with the community provides opportunities to identify potential terrorist activity occurring within the community.

B. ANALYSIS

The police department’s limited success with the implementation of Web 2.0 technology requires further consideration. The organization’s use of www.CrimeReports.com and www.twitter.com should continue. Web 2.0 technologies may provide additional tools to further the department’s efforts in strengthening the
organization’s way of sharing information and collaborating with the community. Both are essential elements in the future success of the department’s intelligence-led policing efforts. It is imperative that the police department provide the appropriate tools for the community and business owners to communicate effectively with the police. The police department is asking the community for assistance but failing to provide sufficient means leaves everyone possibly to fail the goal of citizen safety and increased collaboration. The current Web 2.0 application used by the organization does not provide a seamless process for two-way communication with the public. Improved methods of technology must be sought to enhance the non-major law enforcement’s ability to strengthen collaboration with the community. Identifying and implementing technology for little, or no cost, can increase the likelihood that citizens will report suspicious activity or criminal activity that may have a nexus to terrorism.

During this review of available Web 2.0 options, the discovery of a new social networking program called Neighborhood Central, produced by CrimeReports, may prove beneficial to LE agencies facing similar collaboration barriers (Figure 7).
Founder and CEO of CrimeReports, Greg Whisenant, states, “Our goal from inception has been to provide a tool that connects people with their local law enforcement agency to share information and easily communicate with each other. The unique dialogue Neighborhood Central provides enables citizens to play a direct, personal role in public safety and extend the reach of law enforcement agencies to serve communities more efficiently and effectively” (Crime Reports, 2010, News Section). Furthermore, Whisenant states, “Neighborhood Central facilitates a secure dialogue between citizens and law enforcement about local crime activity and community policing efforts, making it easier for users to take an active role in making their community safer. The new utility
will leverage mobile devices and established social networks to keep users connected and informed” (Crime Reports, 2010, News Section). Timely, accurate crime reporting and notification enables both officers of the agency and the community an accurate picture of what crime and disorder is occurring within the community. Timely, accurate crime reporting enables agencies to identify crime patterns or patterns of suspicious activity. Both of these identifiers enable the agency and community to collaborate efforts in solving problems.

As LE agencies consider opportunities to strengthen information sharing and collaboration capabilities, Neighborhood Central should be specifically reviewed to determine if this program meets the need of the organization. This Web 2.0 technology provides a web-based platform providing two-way communication between the community and the police officers who serve them.

If LE agencies consider implementation of Web 2.0 technology, the organization should consider three primary concerns. First, if the organization chooses to subscribe to this new social networking technology, how will the organization market the product to encourage more citizens and businesses to participate than that found with other forms of Web 2.0 technology? It is imperative that organizations consider the implementation of a marketing strategy to increase the number of end users. Secondly, the police department must consider how the organization responds to the information it receives. If an organization chooses to implement Neighborhood Central, a system providing timely feedback and response from the organization will be critical. Finally, due to budget constraints, the technology must be affordable to the organization. Crimereports.com and NeighborhoodCentral.com base the annual service on the size of the police agency. For example, for an agency the size of the City of Independence, Missouri, both Crimereports.com and NeighborhoodCentral.com services can be purchased yearly for fewer than $5,000. Crimereports.com provides computer generated crime statistical information saving hundreds of manhours per year in crime data collection.

Although the Independence Missouri Police Department made an effort to use Web 2.0 technologies, the current utilization and success of these applications is extremely limited. The means of bringing the community, businesses, and the police
department together is essential to a police department’s intelligence-led process. Even though non-major law enforcement agencies do not have the federal funding or manpower, they cannot ignore the importance of community involvement. Community involvement is critical to established programs that focus on building collaboration.
VI. CONCLUSION

The need for homeland security is not going away. As a leader within a police agency, it is critical to the safety of the community and all citizens within it to be afforded the right to live in a terror free world. The security of the nation depends on a united homeland security program; the problem is money to fund such programs. The economy today does not warrant any business or organization to spend money freely without being able to prove its worth. Every agency must be creative with resources and achieve goals with what they have available. Non-major police departments have to take this one step further because federal funding is available. Resources have to be carefully deployed and decisions must be based upon successful evaluation of data, which is not only smart practice, but also enhances trust between the community and local law enforcement.

The UK policing model has been successful and provided the necessary framework in implementing the strategy that is in place. The Independence Missouri Police Department has documented success with the implementation of CORE and COPS. These two models provide a starting point for future homeland security programs. Incorporating TLOs in a department and providing SAR reporting as the way of documenting areas of concern, can be implemented by any non-major agency with little to no cost.

Pieces of a very dynamic puzzle are continually discovered, which reveals an uncertain future. Finding the correct puzzle piece takes time and resources. Homeland security is a vital piece that must be properly placed within every department. It is a piece that deserves respect. It is a piece that is not going away.
# APPENDIX A. Core Crime Statistical Information (From Dachenhausen, 2010)

## 2010-004 (Hawthorne & Susquehanna Ridge Area (Property Crimes))

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<tr>
<td>Larceny - Theft from Motor Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Larceny - Theft Motor Vehicle Parts/Access</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

We initiated 10-04 on 4/24***

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![Graph showing crime statistics](image-url)
# APPENDIX B. EXAMPLE OF CORE ACTIVITY REPORTING

## CORE Issue Description: Hawthorne & Susquehanna Ridge Area-PROPERTY CRIMES

**CORE Number: 2010-04**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Division/Unit</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/23/2010</td>
<td>D-Watch Patrol</td>
<td>Sgt. B. Vaughan</td>
<td>The CORE project was busy tonight. P. O. Lane and P. O. Syme conducted pro-active foot patrol in the CORE area. They found an open window at 719 Dover Dr. and discovered 719 had copper theft damage that was un-reported. They also found two other doors in that proximity that was also unsecured.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Txxxxxx, Earnest D. b/m xx/xx/xx 16839 E. 5th St.
Txxxxxx gave his sisters residence - but he doesn't stay there… no other address to give.
He stated that he is taking free GED classes that are given at the Hawthorne office.

One car stop and a summons issued.

### Date: 4/29/2010  Division/Unit: D-Watch  Officer: PO Stetzler / PO Coale
Car check at 5th and Jennings. (#10-38950) Tyler E. Bxxxxx arrested for Traffic Violations as well as Narcotics and Parties.

### Date: 5/1/2020  Division/Unit: A-Watch  Officer: J. Onka
Robbery reported at 17111 E 24 Hwy. Report taken, scene processed by P. O. Onka. Detectives notified. Suspect description: male white plaid shorts and a white and black jacket, face covered with a white bandana armed with a silver in color handgun.

### Date: 5/2/2010  Division/Unit: A-Watch  Officer: P. O. Head/Cole
Ped check 24Hwy Concord - Samuel Wxxxx w/m xx/xx/xx1305 N. Osage. Auto Theft subject10-39889

### Date: 5/2/2010  Division/Unit: A-Watch  Officer: P. O. Head/Cole
Car stop Jake Hxxxxxx w/m xx/xx/xx.

### Date: 5/4/2010  Division/Unit: D-Watch  Officer: PO Lane
Ped check Hawthorne Apartments - Suspicious Subject, Wilfred E. Sxxxxx, b/m, xx/xx/xx, was arrested on warrants. #10-40387

### Date: 5/4/2010  Division/Unit: D-Watch  Officer: PO Syme / PO Schmidli & Others
0218 hours Armed Robbery at 7-11, 17801 E. 24 Hwy. which resulted in a car chase and apprehension of the suspect of this robbery and a previous Armed Robbery at 12333 E. 40 Hwy. this same night. Reports #10-40389 & #10-40383.

### Date: 5/5/2010  Division/Unit: C-Watch  Officer: Officer Shaw
Officer Shaw conducted patrol in the Cler-mont Elementary School parking lot. Once there, he found a suspicious occupied vehicle. After contact with the driver, Paul Bxxxxxx a search was conducted due to a purported marijuana odor. Subsequent to the search, Officer Shaw found approximately 17 grams of marijuana. Reference report 10-41042

### Date: 5/6/2010  Division/Unit: C Watch  Officer: Waterworth
ETS activation on the Bait Car, at 639 N. Dover. The computer in which the ETS was attached to was taken. The activation led him to 615 N. Peck, where the stolen computer was located and two taken into custody. 2010-41375
Suspect 1: Kxxxxxx, David N. Jr. BM xx/xx/xx
Suspect 2: Mxxxxx, Jose, L. BM xx/xx/xx

### Date: 5/7/2010  Division/Unit: C Watch  Officer: Waterworth
He observed a vehicle pulling out from behind the closed businesses at 908 N. Atherton. Seconds later, the ETS at that location went off. The vehicle was stopped and two subjects were identified. They were in possession of bolt cutters, snips, voltage meters, pole climbing straps and other items used to steal copper. It is believed that they were in the process of stealing copper, when JACO Sheriff’s Dept. was in pursuit just north of the location, most likely startling them. They were arrested for the possession of the burglary
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date: 5/6/2010</th>
<th>Division/Unit: Invest. A</th>
<th>Officer: Det. Stewart</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On 05-06-10 Det. Stewart deployed the bait car with an active ETS system on a laptop computer in front of the address of 639 Dover Dr., At approximately 2139 hrs. Dispatch and officers received an ETS activation from the bait car. Officer did a great job and followed the device to the address of 615 N. Peck Ct. where the laptop was located and two suspects were apprehended. Both suspect gave their statements/confessions but only admitted to this only larceny from auto. The main suspect, David Kxxxxxx, is residing at the address of 638 Dover Dr. with a Heather Bxxxxxx. Just in case there is pattern in that area.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date: 5/8/2010</th>
<th>Division/Unit: D-Watch</th>
<th>Officer: PO Showman &amp; PO Abraham</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Car check involving Tyler Mxxxxx (16 yrs), Michael Wxxx (17 yrs) and Carlton Hxxxxx (20 yrs) taken into custody for narcotics and alcohol violations. Rpt #10-42115.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date: 5/16/2010</th>
<th>Division/Unit: C Watch</th>
<th>Officer: Spade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location: 600 S. M291 Highway (Benfer's Tow lot)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suspect: Bxxxxxxx, Cassandra M WF xx/xx/xx</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect: Sxxxx, Christopher A WM xx/xx/xx</td>
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<tr>
<td>Both suspects were caught inside the Benfer Tow lot, stealing a car stereo. A search of their vehicle, that was park outside the fence, yielded a small amount of drugs.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date: 5/15/2010</th>
<th>Division/Unit: A Watch</th>
<th>Officer: Marriott</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location: 16801 E. 24 Hwy (Quiktrip)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suspect #1: Unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suspect #2: Sxxxxx, Kenneth J. W/M, xx/xx/xx</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officers were dispatched to the area of Frederick and College when an individual called 911 advising they were following their father in law’s stolen vehicle. Officer Mariott located the stolen auto at 24 Hwy and Kiger and began following it waiting on additional units. When the stolen auto arrived at the Quiktrip, 24 Hwy and Dover, the driver pulled into the lot, bailed out of the vehicle and ran behind the business and in to the area of the Hawthorne Apartments. Officer Marriott took the passenger into custody without incident. Additional officers conducted an area check for the driver with negative results. Kenneth J. Sxxxxxx was booked on Tamper II.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date: 5/11/2010</th>
<th>Division/Unit: C Watch</th>
<th>Officer: Waterworth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location: 24 Hwy and Concord Circle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect: Rxxxxx, Tony A. B/M xx/xx/xx</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officer Waterworth conducted a car check on a white Pontiac Grand Prix after learning the vehicles owner,Tony Rxxxxx, had numerous outstanding warrants. The car check was conducted as the vehicle was entering the apartment complex. Tony Rxxxxx was arrested on his 13 outstanding warrants.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Date:** 5/30/2010  |  **Division/Unit:** A Watch  |  **Officer:** Head/Cole  
Car Stop 539 Dover: Lionel Fxxxxx B/M xx/xx/xx 5820 Prospect was arrested on KCMO warrants.

**Date:** 5/30/2010  |  **Division/Unit:** A Watch  |  **Officer:** Head/Cole  
Residence check 2001 Concord Circle for Dorovan Cxxxxxxx w/m xx/xx/xx reference stop order for statutory rape. Apartment was found to be vacant with an eviction notice posted 5/29/10.

**Date:** 5/30/2010  |  **Division/Unit:** A Watch  |  **Officer:** Head/Cole  
Kelsie R Pxxxxxxxx w/f xx/xx/xx (Homeless) with 3.7 grams of methamphetamine during a car stop near 1901 Concord Circle.

**Date:** 6/1/2010  |  **Division/Unit:** B-Watch  |  **Officer:** Capt. D. Thompson  
CORE 10-04 Concord / Hawthorne Area  
Officers Pope, Colbert and Dorman conducted directed foot and vehicle patrol in the CORE area between calls.

- 3 Car Stops  
- 2 Ped Checks  
- 5 Moving Violations  
- 1 Seat Belt  
- 1 Arrest Suspended License  
- 1 Tagged Hazardous Vehicle

**Date:** 6/1/2010  |  **Division/Unit:** G. R. I. T.  |  **Officer:** Minter  
Detective Minter conducted the following pro-active activity in Hawthorne:

- (6) vehicle checks  
- (3) traffic summons  
- (2) FI Reports (#2010-50276) & (#2010-50249)  
- (1) pedestrian check (#2010-50265)  
During the pro-active assignment, I was able to identify (2) gang members who were observed leaving the area of Concorde Circle.

I initiated a traffic stop on a black 1991 Lexus LS400 (bearing Missouri license plate #xxxxxx) and identified the driver as Dwain L. Txxxxx, B/M, DOB xx/xx/xx. Txxxxx was identified as a prior (97th Street East Coast Crip). Report FI #10-50249

I initiated a pedestrian check in the area of 24 Hwy. and Dover Drive (Quik Trip) as a subject was observed “jay walking” without using the designated cross walk. He was identified as Eric D. Lxxxx, B/M, DOB xx/xx/xx and was subsequently arrested for Possession of a Controlled Substance (Marijuana and prescription pills). He was also identified as leaving the area of Concorde Circle and identified as a (43rd Street Crip). Report #2010-50265 (Drug Violation) & (FI) #2010-50276.

**Date:** 6/2/2010  |  **Division/Unit:** G. R. I. T.  |  **Officer:** Minter/Winborn  
Detective(s) Minter and Winborn worked CORE #10-04. During the operation the following was conducted:
(6) vehicle stops  
(1) residence check looking for Kevin Fxx w/outstanding warrants  
(3) pedestrian checks  
(4) warrants  

There was nothing significant in the Hawthorne area and no calls for service.

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I took a supp to 2010-52488. This was a 1st degree res burg. I recovered most of the stolen property and took one of the 2 suspects into custody. The property was recovered from 16831 and 16833 E 5th St N. The suspect, Dylan M. Mxxxxxx, W/M, xx/xx/xx, lives at 16831 E 5th St N with his mother. The second suspect, Jeremy W. Bxxxxxx, W/M, xx/xx/xx, lives at 16833 E 5th St N with his sister. He isn't in custody yet. The recovered property was valued at over $1000.

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<tr>
<td>6/12/2010</td>
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<td>Capt. Thurman</td>
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Officers conducted foot patrol in Hawthorne area while limited time permitted. Officers were highly visible with lots of ped foot traffic. Officers made two arrests with warrants, summons and illegal substances recovered. Only able to spend approximately 1 hour in the area.
APPENDIX C. TRACKING OF TIME SPENT IN CORE INITIATIVE AREA

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116.25.33
DATE:       June 15, 2010

TO:         Lt. Col. John Main

FROM:       Travis Forbes, Major
            Patrol Division

SUBJECT:    CORE Initiative 2010-04 Summary

CORE initiative 2010-04 was started based upon a noticeable increase in property crimes within the northeast part of the City.

Initially, the potential offenders were not known, so concentrated patrols were conducted within the area. Numerous subjects were stopped on car checks and ped checks, including several individuals with criminal pasts. A bait car was also set up with a laptop computer inside, and shortly after setup subjects were apprehended stealing the equipment. Bait was also set up on copper wiring in the CORE area, and two subjects were arrested stealing the wire. The amount of self-initiated activity within the area increased substantially during the period, and a corresponding drop in crime was noticed. It is unclear which of the numerous arrests might have been the most responsible for the positive impact in the region.

During the process, the Community Services unit continued to work with the management of apartment complexes within the area in identifying and evicting problem residents.

The resulting drop in crime was noticeable, not only by the department but by area residents. Officers will continue to focus upon this area to help keep crime and disorder to a minimum.
LIST OF REFERENCES


80


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California